Battle of Fort Henry

The Battle of Hampton Roads (8-9 March 1862, also known as the Battle of Ironclads or the Battle of the Monitor and Merrimack) is sometimes referenced as the first time ironclad warships were deployed in battle, but it was not; it was the first instance of combat between ironclads, not the first time they were used.

The joint action of the Union Army under General Ulysses S. Grant and the Union Navy under Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote against the Confederate Fort Henry, under the command of Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, was the first time in history that ironclads were used in a naval assault on fortifications.

This alone would make the Battle of Fort Henry significant, but the victory of Foote and Grant over Tilghman also opened the Tennessee River to the Union, allowed for the destruction of Confederate positions along that river, disrupted Confederate shipping and railroad lines, captured a Confederate ironclad and other ships, and placed the Union Army in a position to move against the Confederate position of Fort Donelson, 12 miles (19 km) away from Fort Henry.

The victories at the Battle of Fort Henry and the Battle of Fort Donelson (11-16 February 1862) made Andrew H. Foote and Ulysses S. Grant national heroes in the North, as they cleared Kentucky and much of Tennessee of Confederate forces, allowing for greater ease in Union troop movements in the Western theater of the war.

Background

When the American Civil War began in 1861, Kentucky declared neutrality. Union and Confederate authorities understood the strategic importance of Kentucky as a border state and respected its neutrality while, at the same time, trying to gently 'woo' the state to their side.

In September 1861, Confederate General Leonidas Polk, acting on his own initiative and without consulting Confederate President Jefferson Davis or any other authority, invaded Kentucky and took the city of Columbus because he felt it was strategically important. Kentucky's state legislature appealed to the Union for help, and Ulysses S. Grant took up a position at the city of Paducah.

Although Kentucky still maintained its neutrality, it was now far more Union-leaning, and this meant that Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, commander of all the Confederate forces in the region, could no longer feel secure in the region and had to spread his forces widely in a defensive line.

The left of that line was Columbus, heavily fortified by Polk, the right of that line was Bowling Green, garrisoned under Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner, and at the center of that line stood Fort Henry (defending the Tennessee River) and Fort Donelson, protecting the Cumberland River.

Grant had moved against Columbus at the Battle of Belmont (7 November 1861), an inconclusive engagement, but it had the desired effect of scaring Polk into thinking a larger force might come against him, so he enlarged his defenses and maintained battle readiness. Columbus and Bowling Green were both heavily defended and garrisoned, but, Grant reasoned, perhaps the river forts were not. If they were not, and could be taken, both rivers would be opened to Union traffic.

Grant was under the command of Major General Henry W. Halleck, known for his caution and indecision, and so had little hope of getting Halleck to agree to his plan of a joint advance by the army and navy against the forts. Halleck, however – like many generals in the Civil War on both sides – was engaged in petty rivalries with the other two Union generals in the region and, if Grant's plan worked, it would greatly boost Halleck's reputation with Abraham Lincoln, who was running out of patience with generals who would not fight.

Preparation for Battle

Union

When word reached Halleck that Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard was coming to Kentucky in full force, he understood he needed to move uncharacteristically quickly and so approved Grant's plan. Scholar Kendall D. Gott comments:

It was a rarity at this stage in the war to find a General who was ready to move upon receipt of orders. During this campaign, it was Ulysses S. Grant. Receiving approval to prepare for an advance on Fort Henry, he began the process of massing his widely dispersed forces. Paducah, Kentucky, was chosen as the army's rallying point.
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An innovation in city-class gunboats had been underway since 1861, designed by Samuel Pook and built by James Eads in Missouri and Illinois. These were the so-called 'ironclads' – steam-powered warships with an armor-plated hull – which, because of their sloping, shell-like appearance on the water, were nicknamed "Pook's Turtles." Four of these would be used in the Battle of Fort Henry. Gott notes:

Flag Officer Foote was working overtime to ensure success by assembling the most powerful naval force yet to serve on the western waters of the United States. The four ironclads, Carondelet, Cincinnati, Essex, and St. Louis arrived at Paducah, joining the three older wooden gunboats Tyler, Conestoga, and Lexington.
(78)

Grant, meanwhile, assembled his army at Paducah, amassing a force of around 15,000 troops. Grant would command generals John A. McClernand and Charles F. Smith, who would each command a division. These would be deployed on either side of the river below the fort and advance with support from Foote's flotilla. McClernand would take Fort Henry by land and cut off escape to Fort Donelson, and Smith would proceed against the smaller fortification, Fort Heiman, directly across the river from Fort Henry.

Confederate

As these preparations were being made, Beauregard did, in fact, arrive in Kentucky but, seeing how poorly Johnston had arrayed his forces, how few troops were stationed along the line and how poorly they were equipped, strongly urged Johnston to move troops from Bowling Green to reinforce Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

Massing troops at these two forts would protect the rivers, Beauregard noted, and would also create a strong center to the line and allow for those garrisons to reinforce Bowling Green if necessary. Johnston rejected this plan on the grounds that the Union would be more likely to strike at Bowling Green or Columbus. No reinforcements would be sent, Johnston decided, and so Beauregard, unable to change the situation in Kentucky in any way, returned south. This decision may not have exactly doomed the garrison at Fort Henry, but it certainly did them no favors.

Fort Henry

Fort Henry was a five-sided fortification on the eastern bank of the Tennessee River whose site had been chosen in 1861 by the attorney-turned-soldier Daniel S. Donelson (for whom Fort Donelson was named). Engineers traveling with Donelson strongly urged him to reconsider because the site was a former steamboat landing (known as Kirkman's Landing) and, as such, was low-lying close to the river.

This worked well for steamboats loading and unloading cargo and passengers but was a terrible position for a fort because whatever was built there would be susceptible to flooding. Even so, the fort's purpose was to guard the river, and the site had an unobstructed command of fire 2 miles (3.2 km) downriver. Donelson insisted on the location; the site was approved by General Bushrod Johnson, and the fort was built in June-July 1861.

The fort flooded in heavy rains when the level of the river rose, and more than once. If Johnston had agreed to Beauregard's plan, and if Beauregard had taken over command at Fort Henry as Johnston had asked, his experience as an engineer might have helped to prevent such flooding, strengthened the defenses, and better secured the fort; but this, of course, did not happen. Something else happened instead.

Lead-up to Battle

On 2 February 1862, Grant ordered operations to proceed, despite heavy rainfall, and the ships moved up the Tennessee River, deploying McClernand's division 3 miles (4.8 km) north of the fort at 4:30 in the morning of 4 February. The flotilla then withdrew, with some ships going back to pick up Charles F. Smith's division, landing them on the far bank in the rain on the 5th.

When Grant's senior officers had questioned his decision to proceed, considering the bad weather, he had replied to the effect that the rain would be far worse for the fort's garrison than their forces – and he had been right – as Gott observes:

The rising waters from the winter rains had drastically changed the situation at Fort Henry. The Tennessee was rising out of its banks, nearing the flood marks left on the trees the previous year…The water was rising at an alarming rate and threatened the gunpowder magazine and the heavy batteries covering the river. The guns were now only six feet above the water. Not surprisingly, some Confederates began to wonder which would defeat the fort first: a Yankee attack or the river.
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As McClernand struggled with the rain and stray Confederate troops, Grant, needing to know the range of Fort Henry's guns, ordered the Essex, under Commander William D. Porter, to proceed up the river toward the fort. Foote and Grant were both on board as the fort came into view and Porter fired on it. Fort Henry's rifled 24-pound cannon returned fire from 2.5 miles (4 km), narrowly missing the Essex, which then retired out of range. Grant and Foote now knew how to proceed.

Battle of Fort Henry

As the rain continued to fall, and the waters around, and now in, Fort Henry continued to rise, Fort Heiman across the river was abandoned on 4 February, those troops joining with the ones in Fort Henry, bringing the garrison's strength to around 3,400 men. Tilghman had sent word to Johnston and Polk asking for reinforcements but received no reply. Polk still believed that Grant's action at Belmont in November 1861 was a feint that presaged a larger, more coordinated attack, and Johnston feared that whatever Grant was up to at Fort Henry was simply a demonstration to distract him from a major attack on Bowling Green. No reinforcements were sent.

General Tilghman understood that the fort could not hold and so, to save as many of his men as possible, he ordered most of the garrison to retreat overland to Fort Donelson under the command of Colonel Adolphus Heiman on 5 February. Tilghman resolved to stay behind with a skeleton crew of around 100 gunners and buy time for the retreating forces, who left to begin the 12-mile (19 km) trek in the rain across swollen streams and creeks to Fort Donelson.

There were 17 guns at Fort Henry, eleven facing the river, and six to defend from a land attack, and only nine of these were above water on the morning of 6 February. Further, the powder magazine was underwater, and the river continued to rise. The ironclads and the timber boats under Foote's command, knowing the range of the fort's cannons, moved quickly upriver. The mines Tilghman had placed across the Tennessee had been swept away by the current or their casings cracked, wetting the powder and rendering them useless, so Foote's progress was unimpeded.

18 of the 54 guns of the flotilla were able to be brought to bear on Tilghman's position and began firing on Fort Henry from 1,700 yards (1,554 m) on 6 February at 12:30 in the afternoon, and Tilghman ordered his gunners to return fire. The shots from Fort Henry bounced off the hulls of three of the ironclads, but the Essex was a renovated ferryboat and, as such, had its boiler placed above the water line (unlike the other ironclads).

A well-placed shot from one of Fort Henry's 32-pounder smoothbores penetrated the ship, striking the boiler, and sending scalding hot stream through the ship, killing and wounding 32 crew, including Commander Porter. The Essex dropped out of the fight.

The other three ironclads, supported from behind by the timberclad gunboats, kept up their bombardment for the next 75 minutes. During this time, one cannon in Fort Henry discharged prematurely, killing the three-man crew; another was struck by a shell from the Carondelet, destroying it and killing its crew; another was accidentally spiked by its crew; and the 24-pounder exploded while being reloaded, killing or severely wounding its crew.

Toward the end, with Foote's flotilla only 400 yards (370 m) away and continuing bombardment, running out of powder and ammunition, the fort flooding, the powder magazine wholly submerged, and only one cannon still working, Tilghman ordered the Confederate flag lowered and raised a white sheet in surrender. Foote ordered the bombardment stopped and sent a long boat to the fort to bring Tilghman and whatever senior staff were left out to the Cincinnati.

The fort was so deeply flooded by this time that the boat sailed in through the sallyport – the passage usually used to move supplies in or allow defenders to 'sally forth' to engage the enemy – and the water level inside the fort was chest-high on an average-sized man. The Battle of Fort Henry was over before any of the infantry arrived.

Aftermath

General Smith arrived at Fort Heiman to find it abandoned but with supplies and weapons left behind along with Heiman's and Tilghman's papers, and hot food and drink – to which he helped himself. McClernand, meanwhile, had been slowed by muddy roads, flooded streams, general ground conditions, periodic skirmishes with roving Confederate bands, and other delays.

As McClernand neared Fort Henry, he caught up with the rear guard of the retreating forces under Heiman and engaged but was beaten back. McClernand trailed the retreating Confederates for some miles, however, and retrieved a caisson, six cannons, and other supplies that the enemy had to abandon because of road conditions and swollen creeks.

Immediately after the fall of Fort Henry, Foote ordered Lieutenant Seth Ledyard Phelps to take the three timberclad ships up the Tennessee River to cause as much damage to Confederate positions and supply lines as possible. Although the Essex was the only ironclad knocked out of the battle, the other three were damaged and could not take part in Phelps' expedition. Phelps captured the unfinished Confederate ironclad Eastport, the steamers Muscle and Sallie Wood, destroyed other ships after seizing their weapons and supplies, sabotaged the bridge of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and was assisted by pro-Union citizens in finding and sacking a Confederate camp. The fleet reached Muscle Shoals, Alabama, before returning to Fort Henry on 12 February.

Grant had remained with the reserve force of the army and arrived at Fort Henry around 3:00 in the afternoon on the 6th. The battle had been won, the fort had fallen, and Grant was disappointed he had not taken part in the action. Gott notes that Grant's decision to remain with the reserve was his one mistake on this campaign:

By staying with the reserve toward the rear of the column, he was not in a position from which he could influence the battle. Had he been at the front of the column, he could have spurred the men into a faster pace and countermanded any delaying orders by McClernand.
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Even so, Grant's plan had been a success. The ironclads, though damaged, did not sink and had proven themselves in battle. A strategically important Confederate position had been reduced. The Tennessee River was now opened to the Union – and so Grant turned his attention toward Fort Donelson, whose fall would open the Cumberland River.

Conclusion

The Battle of Fort Henry, like many in the Western theater of the Civil War, is not as well-known today as those in the Eastern theater but, after the fort fell, its name was widely known North and South. Gott writes:

The success on the Tennessee was a purely naval victory and catapulted Flag Officer Foote to national acclaim. However, it was General Grant's show. Any failure on the part of the army to capture the garrison was blamed on the poor, muddy roads and the fact that the Confederates chose to flee instead of putting up a fight.
(101-102)

Had Halleck delayed, or Grant moved slowly, there would have been no Battle of Fort Henry, as by 8 February 1862, the fort was wholly submerged beneath the Tennessee River – and it remains so today. In the 1930s, the river was dammed to create Kentucky Lake, and the ruins of Fort Henry vanished beneath the surface.

Today, a small navigation buoy on the lake floats over the site where, in February 1862, the first ironclads roared in battle, where Tilghman made his gallant stand, and where a fort – which had been almost completely ignored by the Confederate high command – fell, beginning Union control of the waterways of the Western theater of the war.