William H. Russell’s account of the Union retreat at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) on 21 July 1861 became famous almost a month after the engagement (see Panic at Bull Run). Less attention was given, at least in the North, to the missed opportunity of the Confederate Army to press their advantage during that retreat.
In the South, however, President Jefferson Davis and his supporters, criticized the generals commanding Confederate forces that day – P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston – for failing to pursue the enemy as they fled.
In 1907, former Confederate chief engineer and signal officer Edward Porter Alexander (better known as E.P. Alexander, 1835 to 1910), who was on Beauregard’s staff at Bull Run, published his Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative which included his critique of these generals’ failure, following their victory, to recognize the chance they had to end the war by marching after the enemy all the way to Washington, D.C. and taking the city that night or the next morning.
An excerpt from Alexander’s work is published today under the title Losing an Opportunity at Bull Run. The account is considered accurate as the details are supported by other primary documents of the event.
E.P. Alexander
E.P. Alexander served in the Confederate Army throughout the American Civil War and became famous for several events:
- He was the first to use signal flags in battle to send a message over a long distance when, at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) he signaled Colonel Nathan “Shanks” Evans that his flank had been turned.
- He effectively used a hot air balloon during the Seven Days Battles to gather intelligence on Union positions.
- He is best known as the chief of ordnance who was responsible for the artillery barrage of the Union position at the Battle of Gettysburg in preparation for the Confederate assault known as Pickett’s Charge.
- At Appomattox Court House, he counseled Robert E. Lee not to surrender to Ulysses S. Grant but, instead, disperse the army so that each soldier or group of soldiers could make their way south, regroup, and fight again another day. Lee famously rejected this proposal.
After the war, Alexander became a well-respected author, teacher, and railroad executive. His Military Memoirs was well received and is still considered one of the best books on the American Civil War. Throughout, Alexander objectively notes the mistakes of many of the most famous Confederate generals, including Robert E. Lee.
E.P. Alexander died following a stroke on 28 April 1910. Today, he is probably best known for his appearance in the films Gettysburg (1993) and Gods and Generals (2003), played in both movies by American actor James Patrick Stuart.
Text
The following excerpt, Losing an Opportunity at Bull Run, from Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative by E. P. Alexander, is taken from The Civil War: The South, edited by Thomas Streissguth, pp. 55-63. Ellipses indicate omissions in the text due to considerations of space.
President Davis had arrived at Manassas from Richmond, early in the afternoon, and, even then, stragglers from the field had met the train at the Junction, a half mile from the station, with such alarming stories that the conductor feared to carry the train farther. After persuasion, however, he sent the President and an aide up to the station in a locomotive.
At the station, horses and a guide were procured and Mr. Davis rode to the field. He soon encountered the procession of stragglers and heard their stories. He was so impressed by their numbers that he said to an officer riding with him, “Fields are not won where men desert their colors as ours are doing.”
Quite near the field, the road crossed a small stream. Here the surgeons had established field hospitals, and about these and under shade of trees the crowd of wounded, attendants, and stragglers was extensive. As he had ridden along the road, the President had frequently called upon men to turn back to the field, and some had done so. Here, he seemed to fear that the whole army was in retreat.
As he rode his horse into the stream, he drew his rein, and with a pale, stern face, and in a loud, ringing voice, he shouted, “I am President Davis! Follow me back to the field!”
Not far off, Stonewall Jackson, who had been shot through the hand, but had disregarded it until victory was assured, was now having his hand dressed by Surgeon Hunter McGuire. Jackson did not catch the President’s words, and McGuire repeated them to him.
Jackson quickly shouted, “We have whipped them! They ran like sheep! Give me 5,000 fresh men, and I will be in Washington City tomorrow morning.”
In that sentence, as we shall see, appears almost the only evidence of appreciation among our leaders, on that field, of the great opportunity now before them.
The enemy were routed, Jackson saw their demoralization, and felt that, if rapidly followed up, it would spread and might involve the capital itself. And every soldier should have seen in it at least a good chance to cut off and capture many thousands of fugitives retreating by long and round-about roads.
There was little effort, worthy of the name, even to do this. Our small bodies of cavalry did their best and captured about as many prisoners as they could handle. In all 871 unwounded were taken. But to fully improve such an opportunity, much more was necessary.
All the troops best situated to cut the line of retreat should have been put in motion. Not only staff officers, but generals themselves, should have followed up to inspire pursuit. The motto of our army here would seem to have been, “Build a bridge of gold for a flying enemy.”
Jackson’s offer to take Washington City the next morning with 5,000 men had been made to the President as he arrived upon the field, probably about five o’clock. It was not sunset until 7:15, and there was a nearly full moon. But the President himself and both generals spent these precious hours in riding over the field where the conflict had taken place.
Doubtless it was an interesting study, the dead and badly wounded of both sides being mostly where they had fallen, but it was not war to pause at that moment to consider it. One of the generals – Beauregard, for instance – should have crossed Bull Run at Ball’s Ford or Stone Bridge with all the troops in that vicinity and should have pushed the pursuit all night. Johnston should have galloped rapidly back to Mitchell’s Ford and have marched thence on Centreville with Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones, who had not been engaged.
No hard fighting would have been needed. A threat upon either flank would doubtless have been sufficient; and, when once a retreat from Centreville was started, even blank volleys fired behind it would have soon converted it into a panic…
…Both generals and the President spent the valuable hours of daylight still left in riding over the battlefield.
It was my fortune to carry the first order checking the pursuit, and my recollection of the circumstances is vivid. When I reached Beauregard, coming from signal hill, the enemy was in full flight, some retreating across the Stone Bridge and others toward Sudley; and orders were being despatched to different commands concerning the pursuit.
Kershaw, with the 7th and 8th South Carolina regiments, was ordered to pursue across the Stone Bridge and along Warrenton Pike. I accompanied the general [Beauregard] in riding over the field and in looking after minor matters for some time. About 6 pm I happened to be the only one of his personal staff with him.
Rather abruptly, and apropos of nothing that I saw or heard, he said to me, “Ride across the Stone Bridge and find Colonel Kershaw, who is conducting the pursuit along the pike. Order him to advance very carefully and not to attack.”
I had recently read accounts of the affair at Big Bethel [the Battle of Big Bethel, 10 June 1861] in which Magruder [Confederate] had repulsed Butler [Union], whose troops fell back to Fortress Monroe in a panic, though entirely unpursued.
I noted two facts: 1. That Magruder’s cavalry, which had been ordered to pursue, had allowed itself to be “bluffed” by Greble’s US Battery. This was entirely out of ammunition, but it had turned back pursuit of our cavalry by unlimbering [unhitching] their empty guns. 2. That, though victorious, Magruder retreated to Yorktown the same afternoon, though perhaps with less haste than was used in Butler’s return to Fortress Monroe.
It seemed to me now that peremptory orders “not to attack” might result in another such scandal. I hesitated to make any suggestion, remembering army stories of replies by old generals to young aides who had volunteered advice. But I ventured to say, “Shall I tell him not to attack under any circumstances, no matter what the condition of the enemy in his front?”
He replied: “Kemper’s battery has been ordered to join him. Let him wait for it to come up. Then he can pursue, but cautiously, and he must not attack unless he has a decided advantage.”
Better satisfied, I rode on my errand. A mile beyond the Stone Bridge, a member of Congress, Mr. Ely of New York, was brought out of the woods a prisoner, as I passed, and turned over to the guard.
A half mile farther, I overtook Kershaw forming in line of battle, a Federal gun, near the bridge over Cub Run, having opened fire on his column. After a few minutes, during which skirmishers were advanced, Kemper’s battery arrived and opened fire with two guns on the position at Cub Run.
I turned back to rejoin Beauregard, and, at the Stone Bridge, met Elzey’s brigade coming over. It was now nearly seven o’clock and the sun about a half-hour high when on the Stone Bridge I met Ferguson of Beauregard’s staff, bearing orders not only to stop the pursuit, but to recall all troops to the south side of Bull Run.
I asked the reason and was answered that a message had been brought to the generals, who were still on the battlefield, that a force of the enemy had been seen south of Bull Run in rear of our right flank.
Ferguson pronounced the message as absurd and was carrying the orders reluctantly. I soon rejoined the two generals upon the field, and among the staff officers found that no regard was being paid to the story. But the orders already despatched were not recalled, and, until late at night, all the troops on the north side were brought back.
Meanwhile, Kemper’s fire on the bridge at Cub Run had wrecked a team on the bridge and caused a panic and an inextricable jam of over fifty vehicles, including guns, caissons, wagons, and ambulances, from which the drivers had cut many of the teams. Hundreds of the infantry also had thrown their guns into the stream as they crossed the bridge.
Here, Kershaw was joined by some of our cavalry which had crossed Bull Run at Ball’s Ford, and later, by some which had followed the enemy via Sudley. When the orders to return to the south side were received, he left one of his regiments of infantry and this cavalry in charge of the situation. These, during the night, cleared up the blockade and, in the morning, brought to Manassas 17 guns, including the 30-pounder Parrott, with over 20 caissons and many other vehicles…
At dawn next morning, it was pouring rain and it continued most of the day. This heavy precipitation has often been appealed to by the rainmakers as confirmation of their theories that rain may be induced by heavy cannonading.
The reconnaissances ordered were made and, of course, found the country deserted. Our cavalry followed the retreat beyond Fairfax Court House and picked up a few stragglers and about 20 wagons.
These small matters and the artillery captured at Cub Run and brought in during the day amused and interested us while the last hours of our opportunity passed away. Never did an enemy make a cleaner escape out of such an exposed position after such an utter rout.
