The German Spring Offensive, also called the Ludendorff Offensive after its commander, was the last major German advance of the First World War (1914-18). From March to July 1918, Ludendorff launched five major attacks on the Western Front to break the deadlock of trench warfare. The Allied resistance, use of tanks, and massive reserves, along with German logistical failures, meant that the offensives, despite each starting well, eventually petered out. The German Army, which lost 800,000 men in the Spring Offensive, simply could not compete with the combined Allied forces, which now included US divisions.
Last Throw of the Dice
By the spring of 1918, the war was looking increasingly desperate from the German point of view. It was true that Russia had dropped out of the war following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Germany was thus able to withdraw troops and material from the Eastern Front to significantly boost the Western Front. 44 German divisions were moved westwards. On the other hand, the United States had finally entered the war on the side of the Allies, and this gave them a much-needed boost in men and weaponry. On the Western Front in the spring of 1918, each side could field around 4 million men, but as each week passed, tens of thousands more US troops landed in Europe. The parity in men would not last long.
At this point in the war, the Allied air forces had superior flying machines and more of them compared to the German air force. The Allies had also begun to use tanks more effectively, notably en masse at the Battle of Cambrai in November-December 1917. The Germans, meanwhile, remained sceptical of the tank's usefulness. In short, the military and economic power of the Allies combined meant that it was unlikely Germany could win the war if it dragged on for another year or more.
General Erich von Ludendorff (1865-1937) knew that if Germany had any chance at all, it would have to move quickly before the Allies grew even stronger in the field. In particular, a German advance would have to be made before the United States made a decisive military contribution to the war. This was particularly so since the U-boat campaign against Allied shipping was proving less and less effective as the enemy used armed convoys and air support to minimise losses. If Germany were to win the war, it would have to be on land. Accordingly, Ludendorff launched not one but five offensives in the spring and early summer of 1918.
The five campaigns of the Spring Offensive were:
- The Somme Offensive (March-April)
- The Lys Offensive (April)
- The Third Battle of Aisne (May-June)
- The Noyon-Montdidier Offensive (June)
- The Marne Offensive (July)
The Somme Offensive
Ludendorff's first offensive of the spring of 1918 was the biggest of that year. Code-named Michael (after Archangel Michael, the patron saint of Germany), Ludendorff selected for his offensive the relatively lightly and unevenly defended British lines from Arras to St. Quentin and La Fère. The British force was not as strong as it could have been here because the British government, wary that its commanders in the field might attempt a rash offensive of their own, was withholding reserves in Britain. Ludendorff had two objectives: drive a wedge between the British and French lines and push the British back to the coast. In total, 63 German divisions (the Second, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Armies) faced 52 British divisions (the Third and Fifth Armies).
The German Army was to employ new tactics, or at least this was the first time they would be used on such a large scale. The first wave of attackers would be specialised stormtrooper units composed of the youngest, fittest, and best fighters that could be put in them. They were given the very latest weapons, such as light machine guns. These units, around one quarter of the total infantry, were instructed to attack the enemy lines only at their weakest points and to push past or ignore strong areas of resistance. Their real objective was to cause confusion by destroying the enemy's lines of communication and supply depots. A second wave of infantry would then move in and try to deal with the more troublesome enemy units. A third line of infantry would be tasked with holding their entrenched positions in case of an enemy counterattack.
At the same time, the Allies hoped to counter the German offensive, whose build-up was obvious through February, by laying their defences in depth. A front line was only lightly defended with patrols, snipers, and machine gun posts. There was then a second, stronger line where the main fighting would be done, and a third line where reserves were kept who could be moved to where they were most needed.
The German attack began with the usual heavy artillery barrage, this time employing over 6,400 guns, 3,500 mortars, and involving various types of poisonous gas shells. The five-hour barrage was delivered in highly concentrated waves, a technique known as hurricane bombardment, and aimed specifically at the Allied communication centres and artillery batteries. The German infantry then moved forward on 21 March. The stormtroopers made excellent progress in the thick fog, as here recounted by German soldier Hartwig Pohlmann:
When we went on through the fog, suddenly we heard some guns firing behind us and so we turned around and came from behind to a British battery which was firing barrage fire, they didn't know that we had broken through and they are always firing their barrage fire. One of our men laid the hand on the shoulder of the British officer and said, 'Cease fire.' And suddenly they were surprised to see us from behind.
(Imperial War Museums)
In the confusion, the front lines became terribly confused. 21,000 British prisoners were taken in the first 24 hours. Within days, the British were obliged to retreat and cross the Somme River. By 25 March, the two British armies had been separated. Ludendorff, delighted at this excellent progress, became more ambitious and directed two of his generals, Georg von der Marwitz (1856-1929) and Oskar von Hutier (1857-1934), to move towards Amiens, where there was a major railway hub, and to march on the capital, Paris. Meanwhile, a third general, Fritz von Below (1853-1918), continued the original objective of pushing the enemy towards the coast. This dispersion of troops and muddying of objectives compromised the strategic success of the offensive.
The newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Allied forces on the Western Front, Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), made good use of rail and road networks to transport French troops to bolster the British lines. The combined Allied armies, who benefited from strong air support, now managed to halt the German offensive north of the Somme on 26 March. Another German push, this time towards Arras on 28 March, was also halted. In the north, the Allied lines were stabilised, but the situation further south was more problematic.
The German advance captured Montdidier on 27 March, but at least, determined Allied resistance ensured Amiens was not lost. Once again, a German advance had been relatively successful and gained well over 40 miles (64 km) of enemy territory – the largest advance since 1914 – but the old problems of poor transportation, insufficient reserves, and depleted, exhausted, and underfed front-line troops meant the offensive was halted and then had to be abandoned on 5 April. Each side lost around 250,000 men in the campaign (including those lost as prisoners of war). The Allies had lost over 1,000 heavy guns in Operation Michael, but two German weaknesses were now evident. The German Army had just 10 tanks compared to the Allies' 800, and only 23,000 trucks compared to the Allies' 100,000. The war, or rather the long-term chances of success in it, had turned from men to machines, and Germany simply could not compete on these terms.
The Lys Offensive
Ludendorff was still determined to make some sort of impact before the Allies got stronger, and so in early April, he turned to the British lines further north, in Flanders. Here again, the Allied defence was relatively thin compared to elsewhere on the Western Front, and there was the additional geographical advantage that the two British armies here, the First and Second Armies, were separated by the River Lys. Ludendorff once again wanted to take a railway hub, this time at Hazebrouck, and if things went well, the Allies would be driven back to the coast.
The Lys Offensive (aka Battle of the Lys), code-named Operation Georgette, began on 9 April, when the infantry attacked following a German artillery barrage that had lasted 36 hours. The advance by the Sixth Army, led by General Ferdinand von Quast, stretched across 12 miles (19 km) from the La Bassée canal to Armentières. The initial target was a weakly defended area held by tired and ill-equipped British and Portuguese divisions. On 10 April, the German advance was widened further to the north. The Allies, who had no reserves here, were pushed back to Messines as a breach in the front was made 30 miles (48 km) wide. Ultimately, 44 German divisions would be used in this offensive.
The German troops got to within 5 miles (8 km) of their target, Hazebrouck. Field Marshal Douglas Haig (1861-1928), commander of the British forces on the Western Front, called for immediate help from the French and, on 11 April, issued the infamous Special Order of the Day:
There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end.
(Simkins, 55)
A reshuffling of the British command structure put the dynamic General Herbert Plumer (1857-1932) in charge of this part of the front. Plumer had his men fall back to more defensible positions around Ypres. Once again, the German advance ran out of steam, largely due to logistical failures, since the advance had become much bigger than originally planned. Ludendorff did not give up, though, and, instead, directed the advance against that part of the front to the north of Ypres held by the Belgians.
By mid-April, the French were reinforcing their allies in Flanders, and troops were being rotated so they did not constantly fight in the more intense areas. The German Army did take Mount Kemmel on 25 April, but this was the high point of the campaign, and thereafter no more gains could be made. Ludendorff abandoned the Lys Offensive on 29 April. For the second time in 1918, the German push had resulted in little strategic gain and heavy casualties, perhaps another 150,000 men. These were losses that the German Army had no replacements for. The Allies had suffered another 100,000 casualties, but crucially for the continuation of the war and their supply lines, they still had control of the Channel ports.
Third Battle of the Aisne
Ludendorff launched a third major offensive of the year at the Aisne River, a tributary of the Oise, in May. The target area for Operation Blücher, particularly the high ground above the river, provided a natural barrier to any German progress deeper into France. It was an area of the Western Front that had already been twice fought over, first in September 1914 and again in the spring of 1917. Ludendorff's idea was to launch a small attack here and so hold down the French and British armies while he launched another, larger attack on the British lines in Flanders.
After a short barrage by 4,000 artillery guns on 27 May, the German First and Seventh Armies, composed of 41 divisions, advanced against the French Sixth Army, which here had only four divisions, and three British divisions. The Allies did have a further nine divisions in reserve, but the Germans had an obvious numerical advantage. In addition, the French and British troops had only been spread thinly along the front lines, and their defensive positions had not been well chosen.
The attack front was narrow, only 9 miles (14.5 km) wide. The attackers broke straight through the Allied defences and took control of the Chemin des Dames ridge. They then captured the bridges across the Aisne. The two extremes of the original Allied front line were not left unscathed. The Allied left was obliged to retreat to Soissons while the right more or less held its own. The German Army had already advanced an impressive 10 miles (16 km) when, once more, Ludendorff decided to go for broke and try to capture Paris. The capital was less than 60 miles (96.5 km) away and so came under fire from the biggest of the German howitzers, notably the giant Paris Gun.
On 28 May, the US First Division at Cantigny managed to halt the German advance and then beat off a round of counterattacks. This was the first US military action of the war. As the Germans advanced another 5 miles (8 km) by 30 May, the US Second and Third Divisions were sent to try to hold Château-Thierry, where the Marne River could be crossed.
Ludendorff abandoned the Aisne Offensive on 4 June. The Germans had penetrated 35 miles (56 km) into enemy territory, but they had not managed to widen the front beyond about 20 miles (32 km). The US Second Division then attacked at Belleau Wood on 6 June. Defending the wood were four veteran German divisions, and the fighting dragged on for three weeks until the US forces finally cleared the area, albeit at the cost of nearly 9,000 casualties. It was a warning for the Germans that a new foe was in the field. Each side, German and Allies, had lost nearly 130,000 men in the strategically ineffective Aisne offensive.
The Noyon-Montdidier Offensive
On 9 June, the Noyon-Montdidier Offensive was launched, number four of the wider Spring Offensive. It was code-named Operation Gneisenau. Intended as a diversionary attack but with the faint hope that the Amiens and Aisne salients could be joined, the advance was to take place in the north of the Oise Valley, following the course of the River Matz, an Oise tributary.
Before the German Eighteenth Army could even get started, the French Third Army began its own artillery barrage. The French had been warned by German deserters of the plan of attack. Nevertheless, and despite not enjoying any particular numerical advantage, the Germans managed to advance around 6 miles (9.5 km) in the first 24 hours. The French rallied, and the advance slowed considerably. Then, three French and two US divisions counterattacked, using strong tank and air support. The ploy of allowing the enemy to move forward into an area where they could then be attacked from three sides reaped dividends. Ludendorff was obliged to call off the offensive on 11 June.
The Marne Offensive
By July, Ludendorff was running out of options and men (especially the stormtrooper units) as the Allies had shown their remarkable capacity to absorb attack after attack. The German commander had just one more offensive card to play. He now wanted to advance either side of Reims and cross the River Marne east of Paris. The task was given to the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Armies. The advance of the First and Third Army east of Reims began on 15 July along a front 26 miles (42 km) long. This part of the offensive was a complete failure, blocked on the first day by the French First Army under the command of General Henri Gouraud (1867-1946). The French artillery proved a formidable obstacle to overcome, and Gouraud's tactic of defence in depth and not rigidly holding a defensive line proved highly effective.
Meanwhile, on the western side of Reims, the German Seventh and Ninth Armies advanced along a front 22 miles (35 km) long. The attackers made better headway against the French Sixth Army and managed to cross the Marne. A deep bridgehead was established, but the progress was finally halted on 17 July by the French Ninth Army, with support from British, Italian, and US troops. The German offensive, like all the others before it that year, had cost too many men, and those who survived were exhausted and lacking in provisions and equipment. In contrast, the Allies, still in control of their railway hubs and using a system of rotation, were able to continuously replenish the fighting front. German morale was at an all-time low, a situation not at all helped by the spreading consequences of the 1918 flu pandemic, which hit the German Army a full three weeks before it hit the Allies.
Ludendorff's Spring Offensive had cost the German Army 800,000 dead or wounded. There had been no significant strategic gain, and there were no more reserves to call upon. With the enemy tottering, the Allies struck back hard. On 18 July, the Allies launched their counteroffensive, known as the Second Battle of the Marne, and then did so again at Amiens in August to force the German Army into a permanent retreat. Ludendorff described the defeat at Amiens as the "black day of the German army" (Bruce, 231). As unrest grew both in the German armed forces and at home, the war came to an end with the signing of the 1918 armistice with Germany.
