The First Battle of the Marne, fought between 6 and 10 September 1914, was a major and successful Allied counterattack against the German invasion of French territory the previous August. Often referred to as the ‘Miracle of the Marne', the French and British armies rallied to exploit a split in the German lines and impose a strategic defeat on the enemy. Although it looked very likely at the end of August, France did not fall, and Paris was saved. The significance of the Battle of the Marne was that German hopes for a quick and decisive victory were shattered within six weeks of the conflict beginning.
The German Attack
In a highly ambitious plan of attack, known as the Schlieffen Plan, the German high command intended to sweep through neutral Belgium and attack the French Army on French soil. The manoeuvre would bypass the main French fortifications, permit the capture of Paris, and lead to the surrender of France in just six weeks. Even the German generals were far from convinced they had enough troops to accomplish the plan, and they were right to have been a little sceptical that it would all be quite so easy as it appeared on paper.
When German forces began their advance on 3 August, all sides declared war on each other. The First World War thus began. Belgium, Britain, and France on the one side faced Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. Unfortunately for the German generals, Belgian and French resistance was greater than anticipated, and there were significant logistical problems in supplying the advancing army as it performed a huge arc through northern France. At the same time, the French had launched their own offensive against the Franco-German frontier around Alsace. This French attack, correctly anticipated by the enemy, met heavy German resistance and was ultimately pushed back. A small British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of 70,000 men was also in the mix, caught up between the two much larger army groups.
As both sides raced to deliver a single knockout blow to the enemy, there developed a long front consisting of many armies involved in several major battle areas. This Battle of the Frontiers raged through the middle of August. The German armies were superior to the enemy in terms of numbers of men and artillery. In addition, French commanders displayed a total lack of comprehension regarding the damage well-entrenched machine guns could do to charging infantry and even cavalry. The French and German armies each lost around 300,000 men in just 14 days of fighting. The German Army had won the Battle of the Frontiers but had not quite gained the stunning victory it hoped for. Both the French and British troops were able to make some sort of orderly withdrawal in the face of the German onslaught. Crucially, an Allied defensive line was held between Nancy and Verdun.
The German forces were tired, hungry, and they were running out of ammunition and other vital supplies. Even worse, the whole point of the Schlieffen Plan – to avoid fighting France in the west and its ally Russia in the east at the same time – failed when Russia mobilised relatively quickly, reaching German territory in just 15 days. The German high command decided it would be prudent to release some troops from France and send them east, but this seriously weakened Germany's right wing on the Western Front. The Allies now had their best chance to strike a blow against the invaders. The place chosen would be the valley of the Marne River.
The Fightback
Joseph Joffre (1852-1931), the Marshal of France, was determined, despite the precariousness of his position, to regroup the forces at his disposal, including his reserves and troops from the failed Alsace offensive, and launch an attack against the German invaders. The German First Army was commanded by General Alexander von Kluck (1846-1934). The opposing French Sixth Army was led by General Joseph Gallieni (1849-1916). Kluck's First Army managed to advance to within 48 kilometres (30 mi) of Paris. The garrison of Paris was reinforced just in case the ultimate disaster happened. French armies were also retreating further east, but the German advance was running out of steam there. Joffre ordered his generals to retreat to an area south of the Somme River where a stronger defensive line could be formed.
Kluck, seduced by the relative ease of his advance so far, now made a fatal mistake. Instead of following the Schlieffen Plan and sweeping west into Paris, he pursued the French Army southeast, believing he could crush the enemy in one final blow. This decision was taken without consulting the overall commander of the front, General Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916), although Moltke later gave his approval, since it was in line with the advance's overall objective of destroying the enemy forces completely. Perhaps only one day behind the retreating French, Kluck's army crossed the Marne River on 4 September. The swing to the southeast was noticed by French aircraft sent up to keep abreast of the enemy's movements, the first effective use of aerial reconnaissance in modern warfare. Joffre realised that the Germans' latest manoeuvre had exposed Kluck's right flank, the widest part of the curve, as the German forces turned deeper into central France.
Joffre now tasked the vastly experienced General Michel-Joseph Maunoury (1847-1923) with mobilising a force from the direction of Paris on 5 September, attacking the enemy's right flank. Kluck, realising his error, hastily tried to reinforce his right wing, which was already under attack. Moltke, also seeing the danger, ordered Kluck's First Army as well as the Second Army led by General Karl von Bülow (1846-1921) to both face westwards to properly meet the French attack and offer some protection to the other German armies further to the east behind them. This was, in effect, an acknowledgement that the Schlieffen Plan, and Kluck's adaptation of it, had gone badly awry. Kluck managed to push Maunoury back between 7 and 9 September. Maunoury did succeed in halting the advance, though, and, crucially for the larger battle, he had spread the front wider, which brought additional French armies and the BEF into play.
As the German lines of communication broke down, Maunoury's counteroffensive had struck at the German First Army's rear reserves along the Ourcq River (a tributary of the Marne). Kluck was, therefore, obliged to recall his forward troops to deal with the attack in his rear. The consequence of this was not only that the First Army's advance was slowed down but also that a dangerous 48-kilometre (30-mile) gap was created between the German First and Second Armies. The French Fifth Army and BEF moved into this gap and attacked both German armies, Kluck on the left and Bülow on the right. The French Ninth Army attacked the point where the two German armies were in closest contact.
Meanwhile, the fighting continued further east. From Verdun to the Upper Marne, the French Third and Fourth Armies clashed with the German Fourth and Fifth Armies. Even further east, the French First and Second Armies successfully fought off fierce and repeated attacks by the German Sixth and Seventh Armies and so held on to the various fortress towns dotted along the Moselle River: Épinal, Charmes, Nancy, and Toul.
The main front remained from Verdun to Compiègne, a battle line around 160 kilometres (100 mi) long. Here, the fighting was at its fiercest, peaking from 6 to 8 September. The French Sixth Army, in particular, suffered enormous pressure but just held on thanks to reinforcements continuously pouring in, although here, some radical improvisation was required. In one of the great stories of the war, 600 Parisian taxis were commandeered to transport troops from the capital's garrison to the fighting front. 3,000 additional men poured into the battle front. The famously phlegmatic Marshal Foch prepared his now legendary signal: "My centre is giving way, my right is in retreat, situation excellent. I attack." (Keegan, 119).
German Withdrawal
Moltke was still suffering from very poor communication with his frontline commanders, and persistent rumours that a Russian army was about to land in Belgium persuaded him that a withdrawal was perhaps the best course of action. A retreat would allow the German armies to maintain a continuous Western Front and allow for a sweep northwards if Russia really did create a third front. To better find out what was really going on, Moltke sent a staff officer, Colonel Richard Hentsch (1869-1918), to investigate in person and, if necessary, order a withdrawal himself. Hentsch discovered that great holes had been punched through the German lines, particularly on the flanks of separate armies. Logistics continued to be a problem, too. Bülow was ordered to withdraw the Second Army on 9 September. Hentsch subsequently came in for much criticism regarding his decision, but claims that Germany could have won the Battle of the Marne are not founded on military facts. In any case, Kluck also ordered a withdrawal of his army on the same day since a beefed-up BEF had crossed the Marne using pontoon bridges and was now a direct threat to his left flank.
The German armies conducted a fighting retreat, withdrawing some 64 kilometres (40 mi). Consequently, the Western Front was established along the River Aisne and its tributaries as both sides dug themselves in and created extensive trench systems. Hopes of a quick German victory over France were dashed. The Allies, bruised and bashed, had survived the first chaotic weeks of the war. Somehow, Germany's great push had been stopped in what became known as the ‘Miracle of the Marne'.
Two million men had fought, and one quarter of them had already become casualties of a war only six weeks old. The numbers astounded the civilian populations on both sides. Commanders were equally concerned, although they adapted only very slowly to this new military reality. There was one significant change after the Battle of the Marne. As five French armies, plus the BEF, had clashed with seven German armies across huge swathes of territory, both sides realised that such large numbers required an entirely new level of command between the chiefs of staff and a single army commander, and so army groups were formed thereafter.
Aftermath
After the strategic defeat, Moltke was removed from his role as Chief of General Staff. Joffre, in contrast, was feted as a national hero for saving France. The taxi episode became the stuff of legend and was the first signal that this new type of warfare would require everyone – soldiers, civilians, men and women – to pull together if victory was to be achieved. By the winter of 1914 and after a series of failed outflanking manoeuvres (known as 'the Race to the Sea') conducted by both sides, the Western Front stretched from Ypres near the Belgian coast to the Swiss border in the south. A long stalemate of brutal trench warfare followed, with neither side ever making very much progress against the other over the next four years. This was exactly the situation the German generals had feared as Russia entered the war, and so, despite all the planning, they found themselves fighting on two massive fronts, a situation that ultimately cost them the war, even though Russia withdrew from WWI after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.
The valley of the Marne would once again tremble to the thunder of artillery in the summer of 1918 at the Second Battle of the Marne. French, British, US, and Italian troops combined to defeat and push back four German armies, a retreat which would continue until the 1918 armistice with Germany, which finally ended the war on 11 November.
