The Battle of Rich Mountain (11 July 1861), fought in Randolph County, Virginia (now West Virginia) was the second Union victory attributed to Major General George B. McClellan in the beginning of the American Civil War. The first was the Battle of Philippi (Philippi Races) on 3 June 1861.

The Battle of Philippi was actually won by Brigadier General Thomas A. Morris (though this was mainly due to his good luck in facing new and inexperienced Confederate troops) and Rich Mountain was actually won by Brigadier General William Rosecrans. McClellan, however, claimed credit for both, elevating him to the status of a national hero in the North, and leading to Abraham Lincoln placing him in command of the Army of the Potomac and then all of the Union armies; an honor he would consistently prove that he did not deserve.

Even so, had McClellan not been promoted to that post, he could never have taken the undisciplined, demoralized, and defeated volunteer force – shattered after the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) on 21 July 1861 – and transformed it into the highly disciplined professional Army of the Potomac. The Battle of Rich Mountain, then, was the victory that created an army.

The Battle of Philippi (Philippi Races) fought in what was then Virginia (now West Virginia) was the first organized land battle of the Civil War and a Union victory. The Battle of Big Bethel (10 June 1861), also fought in Virginia, was a decisive Confederate victory. By early June 1861, both sides believed the war would be over soon, and they would be the winners.

The Northern press pointed to Philippi as a clear indication that Confederates would run from battle and the Southern press noted the incompetence of Union leadership in their defeat at Big Bethel. It was only a matter of time, a very short time – it was thought – before the other side realized their mistake and hostilities ended.

Still, both sides understood, that time had not yet come. The Confederates at Philippi had fled south on 3 June to Huttonsville where, on 14 June, Brigadier General Robert S. Garnett arrived to take command. He regarded the defense of two mountain passes – Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain – of paramount importance and marched his force of a little over 5,000 men there on 15 June. Garnett set up his headquarters at Laurel Hill with the bulk of his troops and placed around 1,300 on Rich Mountain under the command of Lt. Colonel John Pegram.

McClellan had organized and launched the Philippi attack from his headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio but, after the victory, arrived in Virginia to take personal command of the Union forces. He had been tasked with driving the secessionists from the region of Northwestern Virginia and, after the victory at Philippi, turned his attention to the Confederate forces on Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain.

Morris marched from Philippi to meet the Confederates under Garnett at Laurel Hill and skirmishes began on 7 July. McClellan, meanwhile, had moved to intercept Pegram’s forces at nearby Rich Mountain, arriving on 9 July, and Rosecrans arrived on the 10th to reinforce him.

McClellan’s original plan was for a two-pronged attack: there would be a feint against Garnett at Laurel Hill and a direct engagement with Pegram at Rich Mountain, while another part of his force performed a flanking movement around the enemy to seize the nearby town of Beverly and cut off any escape through there.

McClellan had almost 20,000 men under his command against Garnett’s 5,300 but, in a move that would come to define his command from 1861 to 1862, he overestimated the size of the enemy forces and, instead of proceeding directly with his plans, ordered artillery to open fire to decrease the vast enemy force that did not exist.

On the evening of 10 July, a 22-year-old civilian named David Hart arrived in camp and was taken to Rosecrans. Hart was pro-Union, lived on Rich Mountain, and knew of a path that would lead the Union forces around the Confederate lines so that they could spring a surprise attack on their flanks. Rosecrans brought Hart to McClellan, who approved the plan, and Rosecrans left, leading a brigade, with Hart as their guide.

The new plan was for Rosecrans to launch his attack on the Confederate flank and, when McClellan heard that begin, he was to launch a frontal assault. This action would have destroyed the Confederate forces on Rich Mountain.

It took much longer for Rosecrans to travel the path than anticipated, roughly 10 hours (due largely to heavy rain which turned the path to mud) and, meanwhile, McClellan was becoming increasingly anxious. He finally concluded that the flanking maneuver had been a bad idea and sent a messenger after Rosecrans, telling him to come back. This messenger was caught by the Confederates, and, from him, they learned of the flanking maneuver in progress.

Pegram assumed the attack was coming from his north and placed the only artillery piece he had in that position, arranging his defense around it. At 2:30 in the afternoon of 11 July, Rosecrans’ forces attacked from the south. Pegram ordered the 16-pound piece turned around and pulled back, repulsing Rosecrans twice.

When Rosecrans did not advance again, and – in the haze of smoke from the cannon and small arms – the Confederates did not see any Union soldiers, they let out a great cheer. Back at his camp, McClellan interpreted this as signaling Rosecrans’ defeat and refused to order the frontal assault.

Rosecrans had actually ordered his men to take cover and keep quiet to fool the enemy into thinking they had retreated. He then ordered a bayonet charge and swiftly took Pegram’s position.

The Confederates who were not killed or wounded ran down the slope and escaped toward Beverly – which McClellan had not taken and so was wide open. It was late in the day by this time and Rosecrans chose not to pursue. As it was also too late, and the men too tired, to return to camp, they slept that night in the former Confederate position on Rich Mountain.

That night, learning of Pegram’s defeat, Garnett slipped away from Laurel Hill and headed for Beverly. Around dawn on 12 July, as they neared Beverly, his advance scouts reported back that there were Union troops in the town and McClellan must have taken it. These were actually Pegram’s men who had fled from Rich Mountain but there was no way Garnett could know that.

He believed he was now cut off from an easy escape down the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike and needed to backtrack to take side roads that would lead them south. Meanwhile, Morris had advanced on Garnett’s position at Laurel Hill and found him gone. He ordered Captain Henry W. Benham to take 1,840 men and pursue Garnett.

What then followed was a frantic chase as Benham tracked Garnett and Garnett, knowing he was being pursued, hurled trees, wagons, and anything else behind his retreating army to slow Benham down. His progress was hampered because of the recent heavy rains which had turned the paths and roads to thick, sloppy mud. Benham pursued him easily and came in sight of the enemy on the morning of 13 July.

A running fight now ensued until Garnett reached Corrick’s Ford and ordered his men to deploy and take a stand. He was in the vanguard but returned with ten sharpshooters to command the rearguard. Riding his horse back and forth, shouting orders, Garnett was shot in the back and fell dead into the river. Whether this shot came from a Union weapon or, mistakenly, a Confederate gun, is still debated. Garnett became the first general officer killed in the war.

Garnett’s army broke and ran as Benham advanced. Some surrendered but most escaped into the surrounding woods. Benham did not pursue them, returning to Morris to make his report.

Morris, in turn, reported to McClellan, as Rosecrans had, and McClellan sent a telegraph to Washington, D.C. that read:

Garnett’s forces routed…his army demoralized…have taken all his guns, a very large amount of wagons, tents, etc. – everything he had…Garnett killed…We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia…Our success is complete & secession is killed in this country. (Lesser, 56)

McClellan’s report on his victory at the Battle of Rich Mountain, following the earlier accolades won for the Battle of Philippi (Philippi Races), made McClellan a hero in the North. After the Union forces were defeated at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) on 21 July 1861, Lincoln summoned McClellan to Washington, D.C. and handed him the command of the Army of the Potomac.

McClellan had not actually shown any talent or skill in command – neither at Philippi nor at Rich Mountain. In his official report, he gave no credit to Rosecrans – who actually won the battle – and criticized Morris for inaction by not pursuing Garnett’s army earlier and more aggressively.

McClellan had failed to take and hold Beverly before the battle, had never launched the frontal assault in support of Rosecrans and, by sending the messenger, had actually warned Pegram of the flanking maneuver. Scholar Stephen Budiansky, commenting on the battle, writes:

The action dislodged the rebels but allowed most to escape. wrote, “The Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later. There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that his subordinate was engaged.” (43)

Still, “fake news” is nothing new and McClellan rode “his” victories to become the man who created the Army of the Potomac out of the amateur force that had fought at First Bull Run. McClellan’s obvious strengths were in administration and organization and his personal charisma and care for his men shaped a formidable fighting force between July and November 1861.

He was not, however, a great field commander and this became evident through his actions during the Peninsula Campaign and, especially, at the Battle of Antietam, at which his habit of overestimating the size of enemy forces and his incompetence in command – evident from Rich Mountain in July 1861 through Antietam in September 1862 – finally became too much for Lincoln.

After Antietam, McClellan was removed from command and ordered to Trenton, New Jersey, to await further orders. No further orders came, however, and he never again commanded Union forces during the Civil War. Even so, the army later commanded by Ulysses S. Grant that crushed the Confederacy and won the war was molded and shaped by McClellan; and that army would never have existed without the victory at the Battle of Rich Mountain.