The siege of Khartoum from March 1884 to January 1885 was the most dramatic episode of the Mahdist War (1881 to 99) in Sudan when an army led by the inspirational Muslim leader, Muhammad Ahmad, the self-proclaimed Mahdi, rebelled against colonial rule. The fall of the city and death of the national hero General Charles Gordon rocked the British Establishment, which ultimately exacted a terrible revenge at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898.

Egypt and Sudan had a peculiar relationship in the late 19th century. Egypt was under the nominal control of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The ruler of Egypt, Khedive Ismail, also called Isma'il Pasha of Egypt (reign 1863 to 1879) and essentially the Ottoman viceroy, had imperial ambitions of his own to the south and Sudan. Military campaigns to acquire ivory, slaves, and soldiers in Sudan in 1881 (and others elsewhere) eventually bankrupted the pasha. The British government, meanwhile, had two objectives in this part of Africa: to control the Suez Canal and so preserve the vital sea route between Europe and British India, and to control Sudan since the Nile River runs right through that country and is vital to Egypt's welfare. Britain stepped in to quash a nationalist revolt in Egypt led by Ahmed Urabi in September 1882. The British then took the opportunity to rule Egypt themselves as a protectorate in all but name. This still left the problem of Sudan, where a revolt had broken out in the Kordofan province following the Pasha's attacks there.

The Sudanese rebels rallied around a single inspirational figure. Muhammad Ahmad (1844 to 1885) was an Islamic cleric who, after experiencing a series of visions, declared himself the Mahdi (the Messiah), a figure in Islamic tradition also known as 'the redeemer' or 'one who is guided', a person who is "a divinely guided restorer of justice and equity" (Fage, 609). Muhammad Ahmad led the rebellion in Sudan, which became known as the Mahdist War. The Mahdists wanted to overthrow Ottoman-Egyptian rule in Sudan and spread a new form of Islam both in Sudan and elsewhere, a brand of the faith the Mahdi described as "purged of heresies and accretions" (Boahen, 39) The Mahdists, or ansars as they were also known, were also motivated by the desire to end the repression of the lucrative slave trade, high taxes, and general interference of the Egyptians and British in Sudanese affairs. Such affronts to Islam as the appointment of a Christian governor-general and the establishment of a large Catholic mission in the Sudanese capital Khartoum would no longer be tolerated.

Muhammad Ahmad insisted that his followers wear the jibba, a robe of patched material, which symbolised a rejection of worldly goods. When the army went into battle, it rode its horses and camels before red, green, and black flags inscribed with quotations from the Quran. The Mahdist army was actually a diverse group of peoples, including non-Muslims. This diversity is illustrated by the British nickname of 'Fuzzy Wuzzy' for the Mahdists, since this derogatory name was actually inspired by the striking hairstyle of just one particular group, the Hadanduwa tribesmen. Another commonly used name for the Mahdists was the 'Dervishes' in reference to their religion and great energy.

After defeating a number of woefully small Turkish-Egyptian forces sent from Egypt to repress the revolt, the Mahdist revolution spread from 1882. New followers joined the revolt with each victory. El Obeid was besieged and captured in January 1883. A large Egyptian army under the command of British Colonel William Hicks was wiped out at Omdurman in September 1883. The Mahdists won another victory against Hicks two months later at the Battle of Shaykan (aka Shoykan) on 5 November. These victories brought the added bonus for the victors of hundreds of modern rifles and a quantity of field guns. A Mahdist state was established in western Sudan.

Rather than send an army to defend British interests in Sudan, the British government decided on the cheaper option of a withdrawal in January 1884. General Charles Gordon (1833 to 85) was selected to organise an orderly evacuation of the remaining Egyptian forces and their families still in Sudan. The charismatic Gordon was already a British hero from his escapades in China, where he helped put down the Taiping Rebellion in 1863 to 4 on behalf of the Chinese emperor, and for his role in having helped end the slave trade in Sudan while he served there as governor-general in the late 1870s. Gordon was the public's rather than British Prime Minister William Gladstone's choice; Gladstone once described the general as "inspired and mad" (Pakenham, 215). Certainly, with his Christian zeal and total self-belief, Gordon was a risky ambassador to send on a lone mission deep into Africa's interior.

Gordon arrived in Khartoum in February and, just as Gladstone had feared, decided to ignore his orders and instead try to hold the capital against what seemed an inevitable Mahdist siege. Gordon's excuse for not evacuating was that he wanted to see a successor government established rather than simply quit the country as Gladstone wished. The general declared, "I come without soldiers but with God on my side, to redress the evils of the Sudan" (James, 85).

Gordon's first choice as successor ruler in Khartoum was the Sudanese slave dealer Zebehr Pasha, but he was rejected by the British government, unaware that his experience and connections made Zebehr the best candidate available. Gordon then suggested either a permanent British garrison or the Sultan of Turkey take over, but both these ideas were rejected. Gordon again endorsed Zebehr – obviously not a personal choice since Gordon had sentenced him to death while governor-general – and gave a stark warning: "If you do not send Zebehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away" (Pakenham, 221). This communication received no reply because the Mahdists cut the telegram wires connecting Khartoum to the outside world on 12 March. In fact, Zebehr was again rejected by the British government, which was still convinced that Gordon was exaggerating the danger to Khartoum in order to pursue his own interests.

Despite the wrangling over the successor issue, Gordon still believed that if he could hold Khartoum for long enough, the British government would be obliged sooner or later, under the force of public opinion and despite Gladstone's reluctance, to send an imperial relief force. As the historian Lawrence James notes: "All his life Gordon had been a fighter looking for moral battlefields and Khartoum was one" (85). Gordon's return had been welcomed by most of the capital's residents precisely because they envisaged that such an important figure would surely soon be sent an imperial army to deal with the Mahdists once and for all.

Soon after his arrival in Sudan, Gordon sent the Mahdi a letter offering him peaceful terms and the position of Sultan of Kordofan. Along with the letter, Gordon sent a magnificent red robe and fez. The Mahdi refused the offer and not only sent back the robe but also included in the package a jibba with a note encouraging Gordon to start wearing it.

The Mahdists lay siege to Khartoum for ten months, beginning on 12 March. Khartoum was a cosmopolitan city with a population of 50,000, which included Egyptian merchants and officials, as well as Greeks, Austrians, Italians, British, Indians, Syrians, Algerians, and Sudanese. Over half of the population was made up of slaves. The garrison of Khartoum consisted of 2,500 regular Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers with another 5,000 irregulars. These troops were equipped with Remington rifles, and they had plenty of ammunition. Gordon also had at his disposal a handful of machine-guns, two twenty-pounder cannons, eleven seven-pounders, and a number of smaller field guns.

Gordon was able to fortify the city, already well protected on two sides by the Blue and White Nile rivers. The general built a large perimeter ditch and parapet outside the southern and most exposed side of the city, defence works which connected the two rivers to create a triangle that protected the city. This third side of the triangle was a little long for Gordon's liking, but it was made more defensible by the limited troops he had by having bastions built at regular intervals. The defensive wall was further protected by burying cannon shells and improvised grenades made of tins full of metal pieces in front of it. Long fuse wires meant the grenades could be exploded to best effect in the midst of a charging enemy. Sharpened stakes and broken glass were also scattered to disrupt the Mahdist cavalry. Gordon then fitted out seven paddle steamers and one yacht to act as gunboats on the rivers, and he sent out raiding parties to gather in food for the besieged city and to harry the enemy. With the garrison, cannons, and good defences, Gordon was confident he could hold the city for as long as the food supply lasted.

The Mahdists were prepared to wait for the waters of the two Nile rivers to fall before attacking Khartoum directly, although each day saw shots fired at the city. Some of Gordon's raids were successful and brought much-needed grain for the city, but one expedition in early September was a disaster, and over 1,000 fighting men were lost along with Gordon's best commander, Muhammad Ali.

With public opinion back in Britain fuelled to a fever pitch by regular press reports calling for the government to act, a British relief force was indeed finally organised. This force of 10,500 men set off from Cairo on 9 September 1884 and was led by General Garnet Wolseley (1833 to 1913). Gordon received news of the Nile Relief Expedition on 20 September. Unfortunately for Gordon and Khartoum, Wolseley proceeded along the Nile with extreme caution, mindful of the disaster that had befallen Hicks. Wolseley was also convinced that 'Chinese' Gordon, a personal hero, was more than capable of holding out in a fortified city like Khartoum for some considerable time. The general did at least organise a faster-paced vanguard to travel by river boat and push on ahead of the main force, just in case Gordon was actually in some sort of trouble.

9 September was a fateful day, since Gordon, then still unaware of Wolseley's expedition, had sent his second-in-command and only British officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart, in a steamer to try and get word to the British authorities that the situation was indeed desperate. With Stewart went Frank Power, British Consul and a correspondent of The Times. Other messages had got out thanks to runners breaking through the siege lines, but this seemed a surer way of convincing Gladstone that Khartoum might fall. As the historian Thomas Pakenham notes: "In effect, Stewart was sent as a human SOS" (224). Gordon saw off the mission through his telescope, which he had mounted on the flat roof of the residency. Visible to the Mahdists outside the city, Gordon would spend part of each day pacing up and down the roof and scouring the horizon for the first sign of the rescue mission he was sure would eventually come.

The Mahdist siege of Khartoum was tightened in late September when the main army arrived. In October, the Mahdi took personal command of the siege. On 22 October, the Mahdi sent a written warning to Gordon:

In the name of God the merciful and compassionate…Those who believed in us as the Mahdi, and surrendered, have been delivered and those who did not were destroyed…

(Pakenham, 218).

This communication also informed Gordon that Stewart's steamer had been captured and all on board killed. Gordon did not believe this news. The siege continued. The defenders were dealt a severe blow to their chances in November when a stock-take revealed to Gordon that 250,000 lbs (114,000 kg) of biscuits he was depending on could not be found. The biscuits had been stolen over a year before. Then came a second blow: a steamer ship arrived with news that Stewart's boat had indeed been attacked by the Mahdists. An even more disturbing communication was from Wolseley, who asked, unbelievably, if the siege had already ended. Fortunately, Gordon could not decipher the code of this message, and so he remained hopeful that the relief force was making best speed to Khartoum (in fact, Wolseley was resting his men at Dongola for four weeks). Gordon sent Wolseley a reply to the message he could not read in early December, telling him that the city could only hold out for 40 more days.

By the middle of January 1885, Khartoum had run out of food. Everything that could be eaten had long been ill-digested: rats, donkeys, dogs, and even the pith of palm trees. Dysentery swept through the garrison. Even worse, the waters of the Nile were now low, fully exposing one muddy end area of Gordon's fortifications that joined the two rivers, a breach the Mahdists would be sure to exploit. Indeed, the lowering waters had already allowed the Mahdists to take the fort at Omdurman on 5 January, and so they could now fire artillery both at the city across the White Nile and along the entire length of the long perimeter wall connecting the rivers.

In the camp of the besiegers, news arrived of the first encounters between Mahdist forces and the vanguard of Wolseley's army. The Mahdi decided to attack the city directly before the relief force arrived. In the hours before dawn on 26 January 1885, the Mahdist army stormed the breach in the fortifications and entered the city. At least 6,000 soldiers and 4,000 civilians were massacred. Women and girls were made slaves of the victors.

According to eyewitnesses, Gordon died fighting, firing his revolver at an oncoming crowd of ansars. This was not quite what the public demanded, though, for a Christian martyr, and so the legend arose, helped along by the intelligence department, that the general was struck by a spear as he stood at the top of the residency staircase, unarmed and wearing full dress uniform. This version of events was further perpetuated by the artist George William Joy in his famous 1893 painting General Gordon's Last Stand. The fictional death became an accepted fact and was repeated in the 1966 film Khartoum, starring Charlton Heston as Gordon and Laurence Olivier as the Mahdi.

The Mahdi had ordered that Gordon be taken alive, but now that he was dead, his body was desecrated. Gordon's head was put on a pole, his body unceremoniously left in the palace garden for any passerby to kick and stab. At some point, somebody threw the corpse into a well or the river.

Wolseley's relief force vanguard arrived in Khartoum on 28 January, two days too late. This was not only due to the initial leisurely pace of the expedition but also because it had been attacked by a Mahdist force at the wells of Abu Klea. Wolseley's expedition had also started too late in the first place, which was the dithering government's fault, but the general was certainly to blame for choosing a slow route to Khartoum. Wolseley had both underestimated the Mahdists and overestimated Gordon's ability to hold out in a lengthy siege. At least now the wider world could learn of Gordon's fate.

The death of a national hero could not be ignored. The British government was obliged to strike back at the Mahdists, who now controlled virtually all of Sudan except its frontier regions. Indeed, the death of Gordon and the rather slow efforts to prevent it were one of the reasons William Gladstone's government fell that summer. Queen Victoria wrote in her diary on Gordon's demise: "The Government alone is to blame" (Wilkinson-Latham, 29). However, a crisis in Afghanistan – where the Great Game of Asian imperialism was being played out between Britain and Russia – delayed British military intervention in the Sudan for several years.

Muhammad Ahmad died, probably from typhus, in June 1885, but the Mahdist state continued to rule Sudan. Muhammad Ahmad's successor was his second-in-command, Khalifa 'Abdullah. The Mahdists, seeking to expand their state, attacked Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Congo Free State (the precursor to Belgian Congo) with varying degrees of success.

The British government realised the Mahdist state could threaten the entire region. It was still worried about the Nile being blocked before it reached Egypt, but was even more concerned that France might now seek to exert an influence on unstable Sudan. Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850 to 1916) was made governor-general of eastern Sudan and appointed commander of a large Anglo-Egyptian army tasked with finally ending the Mahdist rebellion. Kitchener methodically led his army of 19,000 men up the Nile, building a railway as he went.

The Mahdists could not overcome modern machine guns and artillery and were defeated, first at the Battle of Atbara on 8 April 1898 and then at the Battle of Omdurman on 2 September. Khartoum was recaptured and looted. Khalifa 'Abdullah was not captured, though, and, with his 10,000 remaining followers, he continued the rebellion from the province of Kordofan. The Mahdist War finally came to an end in November 1899 when Khalīfa 'Abdullah's army was defeated at the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat (aka Um Debreikat).

After seeing off a rival French expeditionary force at Fashoda (an episode known as the Fashoda Incident, which nearly started a war between the two colonial powers), Kitchener was made military governor of all of Sudan. A modern administrative government was established, and Sudan was ruled as a British protectorate in all but name.