The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 saw British-led armies invade the Zulu Kingdom in Southern Africa as part of a wider plan to unify various territories into a single British-controlled state. Despite their spectacular success in the opening Battle of Isandlwana in January, the Zulus, armed only with spears, could not win a war against an enemy with rifles, machine guns, and artillery. After its army was destroyed at Ulundi in July, the Zulu Kingdom was divided into 13 states subordinate to British rule.
Britain controlled the Cape Colony in Southern Africa from 1806, a strategically important stopping point for ships connecting India and the Far East to Europe. The colony included White settlers with Dutch or French ancestry (who called themselves Boers, meaning "farmer," or Afrikaners because they spoke Afrikaans). Through the 1830s, as the British outlawed slavery and population growth applied too much pressure to land and resources, around 14,000 Boers migrated northwards. The Boers fought both the Ndebele and the Zulu peoples to carve out two new territories for themselves: Transvaal and Orange Free State. In 1854, the British recognised these two Boer republics in return for their acknowledgement that they were, at least on paper, under British sovereignty. Another British colony was created, Natal, along the Indian Ocean coast, in 1843.
This rather poor corner of the British Empire suddenly became one of its richest when diamonds were discovered in Griqualand in the late 1860s. This region was made a crown colony in 1871. A huge influx of new settlers came, and exports rose dramatically, with diamonds accounting for one-third. As Southern Africa developed economically, railways were built using cheap African labour. The British, particularly the new Colonial Secretary Sir Michael Hicks Beach, were now keen to unify the Cape Colony and Natal with the two Boer republics into some sort of federation, but the latter were suspicious of what that would mean for their own independence. A loss by the Boers to a Pedi attack gave the British the excuse to annex Transvaal in January 1877, claiming that only a British military presence would guarantee security. The British were still determined to create their federation of Southern Africa, but one serious obstacle remained to the north of Natal: the Zulu Kingdom.
The Zulus were originally one clan of the Nguni people who had migrated down into Southern Africa in the 16th century. By the 1820s, the Zulus had built themselves an empire based on a martial culture, where society was strictly divided by age regimentation. Credit for creating this centralised empire is usually given to King Shaka (reign 1816 to 1828), who had his men adopt the short stabbing assegai spear and use the 'Bull's Horn's' manoeuvre of sweeping both sides of the enemy (the ‘horns') while a solid mass of warriors attacked from the centre (the ‘chest' and ‘loins'). The growth in the Zulu kingdom came at the expense of other African peoples who were obliged to move elsewhere or stay and pay tribute to Shaka or become fully absorbed into the Zulu nation. Conquered peoples were conscripted into the Zulu army, and their chiefs were selected by Shaka. The king of the Zulus from 1872 was Cetshwayo (aka Cetewayo).
The British were wary of such an organised state so close to their frontiers, but the Zulus had, in fact, shown no signs of hostility to their European neighbours other than the steady acquisition of European rifles when possible. Cetshwayo once told a visiting missionary:
I love the English. I am not Mpande's son. I am the child of Queen Victoria. But I am also a king in my own country and must be treated as such…I shall not hear dictation….I shall perish first.
(Pakenham, 56)
Both Sir Bartle Frere, governor of the Cape Colony, and Theophilus Shepstone, an important figure in the government of Natal, were keen to hold on to Transvaal, and the Zulu Kingdom was seen as a threat to that aim. In addition, if the Zulus were defeated, their land could be given to the Boers in order to keep them from seeking to regain their independence. Frere and Shepstone sent false reports to London. These falsehoods described Cetshwayo as a villainous tyrant, incorrectly stated the Zulus had a permanent standing army, and exaggerated the size of that army. Such exaggerations were necessary to justify a war when the British government was already involved in conflicts elsewhere in the empire, notably the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878 to 81). A new war and colonial expansion in Africa seemed to the British government an insignificant and expensive distraction to more important issues elsewhere. Frere well knew this, and he added to his skulduggery by hiding the findings of a commission which had decided in favour of the Zulus in a territorial dispute with the Transvaal Boers.
Frere and Shepstone envisaged a quick victory over the Zulus, one which would give access to fine grasslands for raising cattle and ensure the Zulus became a source of cheap labour for the mines, farms, and railways of the European colonies. The British Army was newly equipped with breech-loading Martini-Henry rifles, while the Zulu warriors had only spears. Frere was, though, "sadly misinformed both about the nature of the Zulu kingdom and the strength of the British troops at his disposal" (Fage, 392).
On 11 December 1878, the British insisted that Cetshwayo disband his army, hand over a number of Zulu warriors accused of entering British territory, pay a large fine of 500 cattle, permit Christian missionaries in his territory, and allow the establishment of a British Resident. The alternative would be war. The Zulu king was given 30 days to respond. Cetshwayo ignored the ridiculous ultimatum, as the British intended he would. What the British did not imagine was that Cetshwayo would manage to galvanise his warriors into a formidable fighting force, men who would fight to the death for their homeland. The Zulus were not, as the British had hoped, ruined by disunity, but rather they rallied behind this new threat to their kingdom.
Lieutenant-General Frederic Thesiger, better known as Lord Chelmsford (1827 to 1905), was appointed to lead the British expedition into the Zulu Kingdom. Chelmsford's force was composed of 7,000 British Army soldiers, 7,000 African auxiliaries, and 1,000 White volunteer soldiers, principally from Natal. The force included field guns and local cavalry. On 11 January, the invaders crossed the Zulu frontier. Chelmsford's key mistake was to split his force into three independent columns (with a fourth left behind on the Tugela River as a reserve and a fifth to the far north in western Swaziland). On 22 January, Cetshwayo ordered his Zulu warriors to attack the central invading column, since this looked the most threatening. It was the column personally led by Chelmsford. This would be the Battle of Isandlwana, named after the large and peculiar outcrop of rock nearby.
On the morning of 22 January, Chelmsford split his central column of 4,500 men, leaving around 1,000 riflemen and his cannons at the overnight camp at Isandlwana. 25,000 Zulu warriors attacked the camp later that day. The invaders, without any prepared defences, were quickly overwhelmed by the Zulu 'Bull's Horns' manoeuvre. Wounded survivors were slaughtered. To add insult to injury, the Queen's Colours of the 1/24th Regiment were lost (although later retrieved from a river). When Chelmsford returned to Isandlwana at dusk, the Zulus had gone. "Of the 1,700 men who were in the camp on the morning of the 22nd, only 60 whites and 400 blacks survived" (Knight, 54). At least 1,000 Zulus died at Isandlwana, a heavy price for victory.
Immediately after Isandlwana, 3 to 4 thousand Zulu warriors attacked a small British force at the nearby mission station called Rorke's Drift. This attack was against Cetshwayo's orders because it involved crossing the frontier into British Natal. At the Battle of Rorke's Drift, just 139 men of the Welsh 24th Regiment held off a massive Zulu attack, all the more remarkable a feat since a good number of the men were invalids. Accounting for over 500 Zulu warriors in an assault which lasted 12 hours, the defenders won the respect of the attackers, who were already fatigued after their assault on the British at Isandlwana and who were completely without supplies. If anything, the survival of Rorke's Drift's defenders showed the advantageous combination of rifles and walled defences that had been so sorely lacking at Isandlwana.
A week after the Battle of Isandlwana, another Zulu army laid siege to another of Chelmsford's columns at the deserted mission station of Eshowe. The British, who formed the right flank of Chelmsford's invasion, were here led by Colonel C. K. Pearson. The column faced 6,000 Zulu warriors, who were trying to encircle it. Pearson had at his disposal a Gatling machine gun and several seven-pounder artillery pieces, and these proved to be devastatingly effective against men protected by nothing better than cowhide shields. The Zulus, who tried to form their 'Bull's Horns' attack, were systematically cut down. Pearson and his 1,300 men made it to the mission station, but the Zulus surrounded it at a distance. Pearson had his men build a formidable redoubt that would have withstood artillery fire, and so a lengthy siege began.
The defeat at Isandlwana shocked the British colonial governors and the people of Natal, who feared an imminent Zulu invasion. The British government was informed by telegram of one of the worst defeats suffered by the British Army in the 19th century. After quibbling over costs for the initial campaign, now a more determined effort was required to restore British prestige in Southern Africa and, most importantly of all, in the eyes of European colonial rivals like France.
To reverse the defeat at Isandlwana, the British government sent 17,000 reinforcements to Natal. The first new troops arrived at the Cape of Good Hope at the end of February, and more came via troopships through March. Lord Chelmsford now entered Zululand for a second time. A crucial difference with this second expedition was that it included machine guns and many more artillery pieces. As writer Hilaire Belloc drily noted in his famous couplet:
Whatever happens we have got
The Maxim gun and they have not.
Meanwhile, Cetshwayo had recalled his army from Isandlwana, but one attack was ongoing. This was to the far north, where one of Chelmsford's columns, the left flank of his original invasion plan, was located. This was the Battle of Hlobane, named after the flat-topped mountain where it was fought. On 28 March, the British commander, Colonel H. E. Wood, tried to scale the mountain but was held off by Zulu snipers, effective despite their antiquated weapons. As the British column became divided, the Zulus attacked in a narrow defile and, routing the invading cavalry, compelled Wood to first take the higher ground of a nearby hill, Zungwini, and then move on to Kambula.
At the Battle of Kambula, Wood was able to hold off another Zulu attack because he had taken the precaution of building defensive earthworks and drawing together his wagons into two laagers. The British field guns, which fired shrapnel, proved decisive, as did the total lack of natural cover for the attacking Zulus. The British force lost 28 men and suffered around 65 wounded. The Zulu army lost 3,000 warriors, and probably many more were wounded. Nevertheless, until reinforcements arrived, Wood was obliged to conduct a guerrilla war in this part of Zululand rather than face the enemy outright.
Chelmsford's second march into Zululand followed the coast and then, on 1 April, moved in towards Eshowe. The Zulus knew that they must stop the column linking up with Pearson's besieged force. The two armies clashed near the abandoned village of Gingindlovu. Without any time to prepare meaningful defences, this could have been a second Isandlwana, but Chelmsford managed to organise his riflemen, artillery, and machine guns into a formidable defensive square with the added advantage of standing on a slight rise in the terrain. On 2 April, 10,000 Zulu warriors attacked the British square. The guns accounted for 700 Zulus in the first attack. The cavalry then left the safety of the square and pursued the retreating Zulus, accounting for another 300 dead. In stark contrast, the British force suffered 10 dead and 69 wounded. Chelmsford then marched to Eshowe, where the siege was finally broken, and Pearson's men were relieved. Chelmsford then returned to Natal.
Chelmsford again entered Zululand in May. Cetshwayo was eager for peace, but Chelmsford's insistence on the surrender of an entire Zulu regiment and all captured arms and cattle could not be complied with, even if the Zulu king had wished to. The Zulu army was now in the hands of its regimental generals, and they were determined to continue the fight. Chelmsford, eager to restore his reputation after Isandlwana, felt the same. This time, Chelmsford split his force into two columns: one led by himself, which marched towards the Umfolozi River, and a second under the command of Colonel Crealock, which headed towards the Zulu capital of Ulundi.
As the armies slowly got themselves into position for a final decisive clash, there occurred one of the most famous casualties of the war. This was Louis-Napoléon, Prince Imperial (1856 to 1879), son of former French emperor Napoleon III. Trained as a British Army officer and participating in a scouting mission, the prince was killed in a skirmish on 1 June.
Spearmen charging against rifles and machine guns could overwhelm the latter, but the high losses were clearly unsustainable. Cetshwayo did try to instill in his generals the benefits of guerrilla tactics and compromising the British by hitting their supply lines, but old tactics die hard, and head-on charges against British defensive squares continued to be the norm. This is precisely what happened at the Battle of Ulundi on 4 July on the plain the Zulus called oNdini.
Zulu warriors had been converging on Ulundi for some time. The British finally arrived after spending a great deal of time building forts along their route, a consequence of not wanting to repeat the disaster of Isandlwana. The two British columns converged on Ulundi. Chelmsford had 5,300 infantry and 900 cavalry under his command. The British general also had two Gatling machine guns and 12 artillery pieces. This force was arranged in a massive defensive square with the cavalry inside.
20,000 Zulus attacked Chelmsford's square. Some Zulus had rifles captured from Isandlwana, but their marksmanship was poor, largely because they did not hold the rifles properly to manage the recoil. The attack was made on all four sides but came heaviest on the northern side of the square and its two corners (northeast and northwest). At 600 yards (550 m), the artillery and machine guns opened up. At 400 yards (365 m), the rifles, arranged in four ranks, provided continuous volley fire. The cavalry behind chipped in with their own rifle fire by standing in their stirrups. The barrage of lead was so dense that not a single Zulu reached the square. A second attack wave by the Zulu reserves proved equally futile. The army of the Zulu Kingdom had been destroyed in just 30 minutes. The royal kraal at Ulundi was then torched.
War correspondents sent dispatches back to their newspaper editors in Britain. The Zulu chief and his people were portrayed inaccurately in the British press as a nation that could only have been dealt with by force. This quotation from the Scotsman newspaper was typical: " a savage pure and simple, abjectly submissive to the loathsome superstitions of the witch finder and rain doctor, and with his life and belongings entirely at the will of a brutal tyrant" (James, 198). There were some sympathetic voices, notably former Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone (1809 to 98), who once told a British audience that over 10,000 Zulus had died in the Zulu War for "no other offence than their attempt to defend against your artillery their homes and families" (James, 198). The war had cost the British an enormous £4.9 million (£530 million today).
On 31 August, the fugitive Cetshwayo was finally captured and imprisoned. British troops withdrew, but the Zulu Kingdom was divided into 13 rulerships. The Zulu people were obliged to live on ‘reserved' land, and although they continued to live under the nominal authority of their tribal chiefs, there was no doubt who had the real power in the region. Zulus were now obliged to work as labour on White-owned farms and mines. The Zulu leadership was beset by factional infighting, and even the reinstatement of Cetshwayo in 1883 could not resolve the crisis.
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli paid the ultimate price for the Isandlwana debacle, and his party lost the next election. Despite his successor Gladstone's opposition to new episodes of imperialism, the Anglo-Zulu War had set the whole of Southern Africa into motion. Zululand became a crown colony in 1887 and was absorbed into Natal in 1897. British expansion continued with the establishment of the Basutoland Protectorate (1884), British Bechuanaland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate (1885), and Swaziland (1893). The acquisition of these territories backfired spectacularly since the Boers were released from fighting Africans and could concentrate their fight for territorial expansion against the British. However, the British reversed their defeat in the First Anglo-Boer War (1880 to 81) and won the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899 to 1902). At last, the British colonial dream was realised, and the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, which unified the Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State into a single, if troubled and culturally divided, country.