The First Battle of the Somme took place in northern France during the First World War from 1 July to 18 November 1916. The battle (not to be confused with the Second Battle of the Somme, aka Somme Offensive of 1918) was fought between German forces and the armies of Britain and France and their respective colonial forces. One of the bloodiest battles in history, there were 58,000 British and British Empire casualties on the first day alone, a figure unmatched during the entire war. In total, over one million men were killed or wounded in the battle, and very little territory was gained by either side as this largely static war of attrition on the Western Front continued for another year and a half.

The battle was originally designed as part of a wider Allied offensive but then developed into a diversionary operation to relieve pressure on the French Army troops at the huge and ongoing Battle of Verdun, located further along the Western Front, where the Germans were trying to capture the French fortress city of that name. It was the French high command that insisted the British attack the Somme area since it was the point at which the British and French front lines joined. Unfortunately, this area was also one of the best defended by the enemy. The plan was for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to attack the German lines along an 18-mile (29 km) front. This front ran from Gommecourt in the north to Maricourt in the south, the latter being located north of the River Somme, hence the battle's name.

General Henry Rawlinson (1864 to 1925) commanded the British Fourth Army, and it was charged with spearheading the attack. In support was part of the Third Army led by Lieutenant-General Edmund Allenby (1861 to 1936), known as the 'bull' for his notoriously bad temper. The total British Empire force amounted to 19 divisions and included units from Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Newfoundland, South Africa, and the West Indies. Most of the British soldiers were inexperienced volunteers; only the ANZAC forces had faced battle conditions before (in the 1915 Gallipoli campaign). To the south of the River Somme was the French Sixth Army commanded by General Marie Fayolle (1852 to 1928) and consisting of eight divisions (no more was available since other French forces were drawn into the Verdun battle). Aircraft were also involved in the Somme battle, with the Allies flying 180 and so enjoying a 3:1 numerical superiority over the German air force.

The German Second Army, which occupied this part of the front, was led by General Otto von Below (1857 to 1944), who had enjoyed a series of military successes against the Russian Army on the Eastern Front. The German force held strong defensive positions well dug into the crest of a hill. A triple line of trench systems was bolstered by various fortified villages and deep bunkers to protect large masses of troops from enemy artillery fire.

Rawlinson and the overall commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Douglas Haig (1861 to 1928), disagreed on quite how to dislodge the enemy. Haig dreamed of a major and dramatic breakthrough against the German lines, while Rawlinson wanted a more realistic 'grab and hold' approach of repeatedly taking and consolidating small gains. Haig's vision of artillery, infantry, and cavalry combining to defeat the enemy proved to be wholly unrealistic, but it was the plan that was adopted.

The battle was preceded by eight days of preparatory heavy artillery fire. Unfortunately for the Allies, the German positions, which included concrete bunkers, were not as badly damaged as was hoped for by the artillery barrage. The 20-mile (32-km) attack front was simply too long for the 400-odd heavy guns to be effective. The British artillery batteries were also insufficient in heavy calibre guns to achieve this aim, and there were problems with the quality of the shells fired. The British Ministry of Munitions had unwisely abandoned its quality controls in order to increase production. The result was as much as 30% of shells failed to explode or, even worse, exploded prematurely and damaged the gun they were fired from.

Another artillery error was to use shrapnel shells, which could not cause serious damage to well-built trench systems or the barbed wire that littered no man's land. Not for the first time, incompetence behind the lines resulted in a heavy toll to be paid only by the young men at the front. In contrast, the French, using a much greater concentration of artillery and heavier guns, succeeded in destroying patches of the German defences. French infantry, as a result, suffered comparatively fewer casualties than their British counterparts.

The Allied commanders finally mobilised the infantry at 7:30 a.m. on 1 July. 500,000 men moved determinedly across no man's land. The infantry was armed with rifles, light machine guns, grenades, and mortars. The well-protected German machine guns caused total carnage against this unprotected target. As one observer noted, men were killed like "swathes of cut corn at harvest time" (Yorke, 32). Contrary to popular belief, most infantry did not simply walk towards the enemy at a deliberate pace. Many officers encouraged their men to dash and weave, but, as the historian R. Prior notes, faced with machine guns, "it mattered little if men walked or ran or did the Highland fling across no-man's land" (Winter, 102).

The British forces made no progress at all except at one small breach. "By the end of the day the British had suffered 58,000 casualties (19,000 were killed), the largest loss ever by the British army in a single day" (Bruce, 352). The heavy price in men, some 40% of those engaged in the battle that day, had bought a mere one-mile advance and the capture of two villages: Montauban and Mametz. Entire units were all but wiped out. In just one devastating example, a group of 700 men who had all joined up at the same time during a local initiative in the town of Accrington, 584 were killed that first day of the battle. The town, back in East Lancashire, when it heard the news, rang its church bells in mourning for a whole day. The British government was curiously silent on how badly the Battle of the Somme was going, and Haig was permitted to continue the offensive as he saw fit.

As a few more minor territorial gains were made by the Allies over the next few days, it was clear that different tactics were required. First, a 'creeping barrage' strategy was adopted where artillery fire was calculated to move forward along with the infantry. This was often effective, but it had drawbacks, notably that accuracy was lacking and so sometimes men were killed by their own side's shells. Other negative factors were weather conditions, when poor visibility meant the varying range of the barrage was much more difficult to calculate, and poor ground conditions, which slowed troops down and created too wide a gap between the infantry and the shell fire.

A surprise night attack in mid-July, launched by four divisions commanded by Rawlinson, did manage to capture Bazentin Ridge, pushing the Germans back 6,000 yards (5,500 metres). As so often happened on this front, though, an influx of reinforcements quickly helped the German Army regain its former positions. The use of cavalry by the British (actually Indian troops) was a disaster as horses were proven to be as vulnerable as men to machine gun fire. Still, the commanders pressed on. An Allied offensive to gain a ridge near Pozières failed on 23 July, although two Australian divisions captured the town. The Australian Corps would suffer 23,000 casualties and cease to exist as a fighting force by the battle's end.

Realising the Allies were determined to attack in strength at this section of the front, the German command structure was divided to better command a bulked-up defence. General Below now took charge of only the northern section, while the vastly experienced troubleshooter General Max Gallwitz (1852 to 1937) took command of the southern section. The on-off battle dragged on, but even strong Allied air support could not shift the stalemate. Essentially, the Allies were frittering away their troops in small pockets of action, which the Germans could attack with concentrated artillery and machine gun fire. The German forces suffered, too, as they were subjected to over 7 million artillery shells through July and September.

The unimaginative Haig, who had never grasped the power of well-protected machine guns, thought only to mount another large offensive in mid-September. Haig was convinced, without much evidence, that German morale was about to crack. This time, the front would be extended by 12 miles (25.5 km) to the south. The extension of the attack brought the French Tenth Army, commanded by General Alfred Micheler (1861 to 1931), into the fray. This new phase, sometimes called the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, saw the Allies enjoy a distinct numerical advantage over the enemy: 12 divisions against 6.5.

For the new offensive, the Allies had 49 tanks at their disposal. This new mechanised weapon proved promising, but unfortunately for the Allies, they had too few to be decisive here, and those they had proved to be mechanically unreliable (17 broke down before reaching the enemy lines). In addition, the tank crews were not yet fully trained, and Haig was still not quite sure how best to use them. Nevertheless, the infantry offensive did make breakthroughs, on average around 1.5 miles (2.4 km) in certain central sections. As usual, when the enemy's reinforcements were brought in, the beleaguered attackers had no choice but to retreat.

Poor weather contributed to the halting of the offensive. Some minor British gains were made towards the end of September, but the battle conditions were becoming increasingly decisive. By October, the whole area was a sea of mud. More limited Allied attacks were still conducted, notably the Battle of Transloy Ridge. In November, the Allies captured the field fortress of Beaumont and the town itself. After four and a half bloody months, the Battle of the Somme was ended by the first snowfalls.

The Allies "had gained a crescent-shaped area about six miles across at its widest point, but there had been no breakthrough" (Bruce, 354). Despite capturing the front three German trench lines, the gains were limited, since the Germans had constructed new trench systems directly behind those captured. A lot of men had died for very little. The British and British Empire forces suffered 432,000 casualties, which included around 150,000 dead and 100,000 wounded so badly they could not rejoin the war. The French forces endured over 200,000 casualties. The Germans suffered at least 230,000 casualties (Winter, 108). Haig had wiped out half of the British force on the Western Front, earning himself a new moniker: 'the Butcher of the Somme'.

At least the Battle of the Somme had served its strategic purpose: relieve pressure on Verdun and grind down a serious chunk of the enemy's army. Another positive was that the British Army had learnt, albeit the hard way, how to better use artillery in combination with infantry, tanks, and air support. There would never be a repeat of the losses of the first day of the Battle of the Somme. Public support for the war effort continued to hold strong thanks to such pro-war films as the Battle of the Somme, which was seen by 20 million people.

The cost of the battle had been terrible for the Allies, but Germany could afford its losses even less. No major German offensive was launched for another 15 months. This part of France would witness more death and injury in the spring of 1918 when the Allies once again launched a major offensive here. The Somme Offensive/Second Battle of the Somme ended in Allied victory and achieved the largest territorial gains of any of the previous three years of the war, but it still was not quite enough to end this war to end all wars.