The Moroccan Crises were two international incidents, the first in 1905 to 6 and the second in 1911, when Imperial Germany, eager to expand its empire, threatened France's presence in Morocco. France's position was supported by Britain and Russia, meaning Germany was obliged to back down twice. Although not a direct contributor to war, the Moroccan Crises certainly caused a strengthening of alliances and worsened the atmosphere of international distrust then prevalent in Europe, a distrust which was itself one of the primary causes of WWI as Europe shifted into two mutually opposed alliance groups.

Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859 to 1941) came to power as emperor of Germany in 1888 (reigning until 1918), and he pushed for more territorial and military expansion in order to secure the natural resources Germany's booming economy demanded. This new policy was called 'World Policy' or Weltpolitik. Wilhelm II's chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow (1849 to 1929), and the naval minister, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849 to 1930), were both in wholehearted agreement with this policy, which had the added advantage of distracting the population from domestic problems such as the weakening of the power of the Junker Prussian landowners in the ongoing process of industrialisation and democratisation. Popular support for the policy was whipped up by a jingoistic press. The policy of Weltpolitik only worsened the pervading instability in international relations. As the historian F. McDonough states: "The policy created a great deal of tension, accomplished very little, and soured international relations" (9). As the historian D. Khan adds: "From the 1890s imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied power, eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals, by bullying if possible, by war if necessary" (209). In short, Germany was now widely seen as enemy number one when it came to world peace. Countries began to form alliances to counter Germany's rising power.

In 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale, which removed conflicts of interest in Africa and Asia but did not cover mutual assistance in the case of a war in Europe. The same year, France agreed with Spain to divide Morocco between themselves. Britain agreed not to interfere in exchange for a free hand to control Egypt. The problem was now for France to defend its gains in North Africa. Long in decline, by the early years of the 20th century, France was "a second-class naval power" (Bruce, 139). Germany's navy, thanks to an unrelenting arms race with Britain, was moving in the opposite direction.

Germany was anxious over the development of the Entente Cordiale since France's diplomatic ties (established in 1894) with Russia would effectively mean that three powerful states might align themselves against Germany. Indeed, the kaiser was convinced, despite a lack of evidence, that the Entente Cordiale contained a secret clause that promised mutual military aid in Europe. The kaiser was determined to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale, and the ideal place to do it seemed to be North Africa.

The kaiser, pressing on regardless with his Weltpolitik, was determined to establish a German presence in North Africa, an area formerly under the control of the decaying Ottoman Empire but now broken into areas seemingly up for grabs by any European power with the military means to back up a claim. The German Empire was a paltry affair compared to the large empires of Britain and France. The kaiser certainly did not want to see France expand its overseas interests even further and protested about the situation in Morocco. Wilhelm took direct and personal action, sailing to Tangier in March 1905. The kaiser rode in a parade through the streets of the port on 31 March and confidently declared that Morocco was a free and independent state. Germany wished to have equal trade access with other European powers and promised it would support Moroccan independence. The game of bluff worked in part since a conference was called to decide the issue.

At the lengthy Algeciras Conference, held in the Spanish city of that name from January to April 1906, both Britain and Russia supported France's position. The conference decided that France and Spain would police an independent Morocco, but other nations, including Germany, would have right of access to certain economic activities such as banking and land ownership. France would control Morocco's central bank. The agreement was signed by a long list of nations, including the Great Powers of France, Spain, Germany, the United States, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. In the end, Morocco signed the agreement, which at least guaranteed it somewhat limited independence under the rule, as before, of its sultan, Abdelaziz of Morocco (reign 1894 to 1908). The agreement was endorsed again in 1909 with the signing of another Franco-German agreement.

The crisis had passed, but it left certain questions unanswered, particularly in Germany. The powerful military and political faction in Germany, which wanted imperial expansion even if it meant war, felt that an opportunity had been missed to grab a new colony in Africa. In reality, Germany had come away from the First Moroccan Crisis with very little. The whole escapade had been "a very bad miscalculation" (Winter, 28). More significant, perhaps, was the international reaction. Britain and France, unsure whether Germany was really prepared to go to war over such minor colonial issues, decided that, in any case, forging a stronger partnership would be a prudent insurance against future German aggression.

Germany's longtime fear of being encircled by enemy states became a diplomatic reality in 1907. That year, the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, which diffused tensions over rival claims to Afghanistan, Tibet, and Persia (modern Iran). It was also in 1907 that Britain, France, and Russia joined together in the Triple Entente alliance bloc. Henceforth, these countries and those states that later joined them were often called the Allies. On the other side, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had formed an alliance as far back as 1882; this was called the Triple Alliance. The pre-WWI alliance system of two opposing blocks was now in place, and Germany was prepared to test its strength by manufacturing another international incident in North Africa.

By 1911, the German navy had become even more powerful than during the first crisis. The pre-WWI arms race between Britain and Germany had moved on to dreadnought battleships since 1908. Britain could not afford to back down to Germany, which now possessed a navy capable of threatening the British Empire anywhere around the world. Germany was also heavily industrialised and possessed the fastest-growing economy in Europe. The lack of significant colonies to match the nation's economic power was becoming a distinct point of embarrassment for the German leadership.

It was in 1911 that Morocco once again grabbed the international headlines. A rebellion in Fez in May resulted in the sultan calling in help from France. The French government responded by sending 20,000 troops. Kaiser Wilhelm viewed this as nothing less than a French invasion in disguise and so sent the gunboat Panther to Morocco on 1 July to protect German interests there. These events became known as the Second Morocco Crisis or the Agadir Crisis, after the Moroccan port of that name. A flurry of diplomatic activity broke out centre stage, while behind the scenes, the participants prepared for war. The tensions were finally resolved via a round of meetings, which terminated in a convention on 4 November.

Britain and Spain's support of France in the negotiations meant that Germany backed down, but at least gained a slice of French Congo as compensation. France was given the right to establish Morocco as a protectorate. Another consequence of this second crisis was that Italy felt emboldened enough to successfully grab control of Libya from the Ottomans after victory in the Italo-Turkish War (1911 to 12). A much more significant result of the Second Moroccan Crisis was that many European powers now suspected Germany was intent on war sooner or later. The kaiser had backed down twice; it seemed unlikely that in the event of a third international crisis, Germany would back down again. As the historian H. Strachan succinctly notes: "Europe expected war" (266).

Behind the scenes, Germany was indeed secretly preparing for war. The German chief of staff was Helmuth von Moltke (1848 to 1916). In August 1911, in the midst of the Second Moroccan Crisis, Moltke wrote to his wife:

I am beginning to get sick and tired of this unhappy Moroccan affair…If we again slip away from this affair with our tail between our legs and if we cannot bring ourselves to put forward a determined claim which we are prepared to force through with the sword, I shall despair of the future of the German Empire.

(Winter, 31)

Moltke revised the Schlieffen Plan, Germany's secret plan of attack on France, drawn up in 1905. Other generals in other countries were also preparing plans of attack on their neighbours, notably in France and Russia. The admirals of the British Royal Navy were not idle either and, as early as 1908, had prepared a feasibility study of how a total blockade of Germany might be achieved. Certainly, by 1912, Britain and France had strengthened their alliance with the former, promising the formation of an expeditionary force of 150,000 men to be sent to France if required. Britain, France, and Russia also signed naval agreements with each other. Germany now faced the very real possibility of fighting on two fronts (east and west) if a war in Europe broke out between the two main alliance blocs.

As it happened, it would be events in the Balkans and not North Africa that sparked off WWI. In the summer of 1914 in Sarajevo, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863 to 1914), heir to the Habsburg throne that ruled Austria-Hungary, set in motion a series of diplomatic moves that ended in all the major powers in Europe declaring war on each other by the middle of August 1914.