The Atlanta Campaign (7 May to 2 September 1864) was a major military campaign in the western theater of the American Civil War (1861 to 1865). It saw a large Union force under Major General William Tecumseh Sherman invade Georgia, constantly outmaneuvering the Confederate Army of Tennessee, until he came to the strategically significant city of Atlanta. After several bloody battles, Sherman captured Atlanta on 2 September, delivering one of the final death blows to the Confederate States.

In the spring of 1864, as the American Civil War entered its fourth and final year, both the Union and Confederate sides braced themselves for what promised to be yet another grueling and blood-soaked campaign season. Ulysses S. Grant, general-in-chief of the Union armies, hoped to break the fighting strength of the Southern Confederacy with a series of coordinated offensives across multiple fronts – while he remained in Virginia to square off against Confederate General Robert E. Lee, Grant entrusted command of the western theater of operations to his favorite subordinate, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman. Grant instructed Sherman to invade Georgia and capture the city of Atlanta, a major supply and railroad center, the fall of which would seriously cripple the Confederate war effort. Sherman was also ordered to destroy the Confederate Army of Tennessee, led by General Joseph E. Johnston, and to "get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their resources" (quoted in Foote, 318).

Sherman was all too ready to comply. A tall, lanky man with a close-cropped, rust-red beard and a personal intensity that tended to exhaust those in his presence, he quickly set about preparing the campaign. His invasion force consisted of 98,000 men, spread out across three separate armies: the 60,000-man Army of the Cumberland, under Major General George H. Thomas, a burly Virginian who had stayed loyal to the Union and was known for his steadfastness under fire; the 25,000-man Army of the Tennessee under Major General James B. McPherson, a young West Point graduate and protégé of Sherman's; and the 13,000-man Army of the Ohio under Major General John M. Schofield. To keep such a large army supplied and fed, Sherman hoped to utilize the railroads from his base at Chattanooga but knew that he could live off the land if need be, writing Grant that "Georgia has a million inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve" (ibid).

The opposing army – the Confederate Army of Tennessee – was meanwhile entrenched atop Rocky Face Ridge, a 20-mile (36-km) long bastion that defended the rebel supply chain to Atlanta. Its commander, General Johnston, knew that he could not hope to match Sherman in strength of numbers. Indeed, by the end of May, Johnston had only 65,000 men spread out across three infantry and one cavalry corps. Instead, he would use the topography of northern Georgia to his advantage. Consisting of steep mountains and swift rivers, the terrain greatly favored defense, leading Johnston to rely on seeking out defensive ground and goading Sherman into attacking him. While this may have been prudent, it did nothing to dispel Johnston's reputation as an overly cautious commander. One story highlighting his timidity circulated through the army camps – sometime before the war, he had been invited on a duck hunting trip, but despite his reputation as an expert marksman, he never fired his gun during the entire hunt. "The bird flew too high or too low – the dogs were too far or too near – things never did suit exactly. He was…afraid to miss and risk his fine reputation" (quoted in McPherson, 744).

At the opening of the campaign on 7 May 1864, Sherman decided not to attack Johnston's army on Rocky Face Ridge head-on, refusing to send his men into what he deemed a "terrible door of death" (quoted in McPherson, 744). Instead, he sought to outmaneuver his opponent. While the bulk of the Union army under generals Thomas and Schofield demonstrated against the Confederate center, McPherson led a smaller force in a wide arc around the enemy right. On 9 May, McPherson passed through the unguarded Snake Creek Gap and marched to the town of Resaca, Georgia, intending to destroy the Confederate supply base there. He was shocked, however, to find the town defended by two rebel brigades, having expected to find the place empty. McPherson hesitated, allowing Johnston time to notice the threat in his rear and rush reinforcements to Resaca. On 12 May, Johnston pulled his entire army back to Resaca, depriving McPherson of his chance to wreak havoc in the rear of the rebel army. "Well, Mac," said a disappointed Sherman to his protégé, "you missed the opportunity of your life" (ibid).

For the next three days, Sherman's troops probed the Confederate defenses at Resaca but were unable to find a weak spot. Then, on 15 May, McPherson once again circled around the Confederate right flank, crossing over the Oostanaula River to threaten the enemy supply lines. His position once again compromised, Johnston had no choice but to retreat, withdrawing along the Western & Atlantic Railroad while his cavalry fought several rearguard skirmishes. Under heavy pressure from his officers – and from the administration at Richmond – to turn and fight, Johnston stopped retreating on 18 May at Cassville, where he planned to ambush two of Sherman's leading corps. "You will now turn and march to meet advancing columns," he told his men in a spirited general order. "Soldiers, I lead you to battle" (ibid). But the next morning, one of Johnston's corps commanders, Lieutenant General John Bell Hood, reported two divisions of Union cavalry on his flank and refused to attack. The opportunity lost, Johnston once again retreated, much to the consternation of his army. "I could not restrain my tears when I found we could not strike," wrote Johnston's own chief-of-staff, who blamed Hood for the fiasco (ibid).

By 20 May, Johnston's army had set itself up in yet another strong defensive position at Allatoona Pass. Sherman once again refused to attack. After taking some time to rest his men and rush in supplies along the parts of the railroad he had captured, he began marching toward Dallas, a small crossroads only 30 miles (48 km) northeast of Atlanta. Johnston hurriedly dispatched Hood's corps to block the Union advance at a place called New Hope Church. When Sherman arrived on 25 May, he falsely believed the Confederates were simply a token force and ordered Major General Joseph Hooker's XX Corps to attack. For the next three hours, Hooker's men were horribly mauled as they advanced across rough terrain that they would forever after call the ‘Hell Hole'. Sherman called off the attack around nightfall, and, on 26 May, both sides dug in, with scattered fighting continuing throughout the day. On 27 May, Sherman attempted to outmaneuver Johnston by sending Major General Oliver O. Howard's IV Corps around the rebel right flank. After a grueling five-hour march, Howard's men came to Pickett's Mill, where they found 10,000 entrenched Confederate soldiers under Major General Patrick Cleburne. Howard launched his attack at 5 p.m. but was bloodily repulsed, losing over 1,000 casualties.

The first day of June found both armies still entrenched, with the battlefront extending around the vicinity of Marietta, Georgia. The first month of fighting had cost Sherman circa 9,300 casualties and Johnston 8,500 – though Sherman had suffered more casualties thus far, his losses could more easily be replaced than Johnston's, adding to the Southern general's anxieties about fighting a major battle. The next few weeks saw both armies trying to outmaneuver the other, their lines gradually extending eastward, the air perpetually filled with the sounds of skirmishes and sniper shots. On 14 June, the Confederate army suffered a blow when one of its corps commanders, Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk – who had been an episcopal bishop before the war – was killed by an enemy shell that exploded above his head. Johnston, who was with Polk when he was killed, mourned the loss, despairing, "I would rather anything but this". Sherman's reaction was much colder: "We killed Bishop Polk yesterday," he wired to Washington, "and made good progress today" (quoted in Foote, 357).

But as bad as Polk's death was, Johnston was faced with the prospect of something even worse: if things continued as they were, Sherman would certainly envelop his army. He therefore decided to pull back to another defensive position on Kennesaw Mountain, where he entrenched his troops in an arc shaped line. Finally, it seemed as if Johnston had gained the upper hand – Sherman found he could not outflank the rebel position, leaving him little choice but to order a frontal attack. For Sherman, such an idea was less detestable now than it had been at the start of the campaign. For one thing, he believed that Johnston's line was spread too thin and could easily be overrun. For another, his men were tired of this endless game of cat and mouse and were itching for a battle. So, on 27 June, several Union divisions assaulted the Confederate breastworks, inching their way up the mountain in heat that exceeded 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The rebels put up a spirited defense, forcing the Yankees back down the mountain with heavy losses – by the time Sherman called off the assault in mid-afternoon, he had lost approximately 3,000 men, compared to 1,000 Confederate casualties.

Despite his victory at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, Johnston grew increasingly concerned that his position had become untenable. In early July, he ordered another withdrawal to the west bank of the Chattahoochee River. Sherman pursued and, on 8 July, made a feint toward Johnston's left flank, allowing Schofield's column to cross the river undetected several miles upstream. Some of the Yankee troops swam naked except for their cartridge belts, taking the Confederate pickets by surprise when they emerged from the water. By the next day, Sherman had gotten a decent chunk of his army across the river, forcing the Confederates to pull back yet again to Peachtree Creek, only four miles (6.4 km) from Atlanta. Now, with the war at its doorstep, Atlanta became gripped by a state of panic. Citizens crowded the train stations in a desperate bid to get out of the city, as people in the surrounding countryside took to the roads, leaving the crops unharvested on their farms.

The situation was just as grim in the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, where President Jefferson Davis met with his cabinet to find ways to reverse the situation. The best solution Davis could come up with was to fire Johnston; the two men had despised one another since the beginning of the war, and the last few months of constant retreat had done nothing to improve Johnston's standing in the president's eyes. Davis knew that he could not let Atlanta fall without putting up a fight and decided to replace the cautious Johnston with General Hood, a man with a reputation for aggression that often bordered on recklessness. Robert E. Lee, who knew Hood well from his time with the Army of Northern Virginia, warned Davis that Hood was too impulsive, that he was "all lion" and had "none of the fox" (quoted in McPherson, 754). Nevertheless, Davis officially fired Johnston on 16 July and appointed Hood to the command of the Army of Tennessee. This command shake-up rankled the officers and men in the army. Johnston, despite his faults, had been quite popular, while Hood was still seen as an outsider to the western army and was believed to have a penchant for getting his men killed.

On 18 July, Sherman began to surround Atlanta. He sent Thomas' army to the west of the city, while McPherson's and Schofield's forces moved around to the east. Hood saw an opportunity to strike Thomas' army while it was isolated from the others and, on 20 July, launched a fierce attack at the Battle of Peachtree Creek. Though Hood had hoped to catch Thomas' army as it was in the middle of crossing the creek, his troops got off to a late start and did not arrive until Thomas' men were already across. They attacked anyway, making repeated charges over the course of three hours; though they almost broke through Thomas' line at several points, the Confederates were driven back by the Union musketry and cannon fire, taking heavy losses. The next day, Hood pulled most of his army back to an inner line of defense around Atlanta. In the meantime, he dispatched Lieutenant General William J. Hardee's corps to get around the Union left flank and get ready to strike their rear.

On 22 July, Hood launched his second attack, which would become known as the Battle of Atlanta. Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham's corps attacked the Union center, while Hardee's men pounced on their rear. The attacks were poorly timed, however – Hardee did not begin his attack until noon, costing him the element of surprise. However, he still managed to roll back much of the Union left flank before the Yankees rallied and halted his advance. At 4 p.m., Cheatham's men broke through the Union center only to become cannon fodder for the artillery massed near Sherman's headquarters. By nightfall, it was clear that Hood had once again been defeated, and at the staggering cost of about 5,500 casualties. The Union had suffered over 3,700 casualties, including the loss of General McPherson. Early in the fighting, McPherson had ridden out to assess the situation only to fall dead from his saddle, felled by a Confederate bullet. Sherman had no time to mourn the loss of his protégé and named Major General Oliver O. Howard to lead McPherson's army.

With Atlanta now firmly in his sights, Sherman hoped to apply further pressure by destroying the last railroad out of the city. On 28 July, Howard's men marched out to achieve this objective but were intercepted by a Confederate corps under Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee. In the ensuing Battle of Ezra Church, Lee launched a series of uncoordinated assaults and was beaten so badly that he had to entrench his troops at dusk rather than renew the attack. Although Howard had won the battle, the continued presence of Lee's corps prevented him from getting to the railroad, and he was forced to withdraw. On 4 August, Sherman tried again to destroy the railroad, this time sending Schofield's army. Schofield crossed Utoy Creek only to come face to face with strong Confederate defenses. He tried multiple times to break through the rebel lines but was repulsed each time. On 7 August, Sherman gave up trying to reach the railroad and decided to settle down for a more traditional siege. His men dug in and settled into a waiting game to see how long Hood and his battered army could hold out.

In the four battles of late July and early August, Hood had lost about 15,000 men, compared to only 6,000 Northern casualties. It was a staggering price that he could ill-afford to pay, especially as Sherman began to tighten his grip. By mid-August, the Yankees were shelling the city, raining fire down upon soldiers and civilians alike. Elsewhere, Union cavalry raids tore up the surrounding railways, preventing vital food supplies from reaching the city. Local newspapers desperately tried to keep up morale, presenting Hood's costly attacks as victories and boldly proclaiming that "the Yankee forces will disappear Atlanta before the end of August" (quoted in McPherson, 755). But as the end of August approached, the Atlantans found themselves no less hungry, their city no less surrounded. Hood knew he had to do something or risk losing both Atlanta and his army.

But it was Sherman, not Hood, who acted first. On 25 August, he sent most of his infantry corps on a wide swing toward Jonesborough, 20 miles (32 km) south of Atlanta – Sherman knew that if he could cut the railroad supply lines there, Hood would have no choice but to retreat, and Atlanta would be his. Hood knew this, too, and sent Hardee with two corps to meet the advancing Northern troops. Hardee arrived on 31 August but found the Yankees already entrenched; he attacked but was beaten back with heavy losses. The next day, Sherman counterattacked and broke through Hardee's line, forcing the rebels to retreat. After the Battle of Jonesborough, Hood saw that the writing was on the wall. On the evening of 1 September, he pulled out of Atlanta, destroying 81 rail cars filled with ammunition and other supplies as he went. Sherman occupied Atlanta on 2 September, raising the US flag above city hall for the first time since Georgia's secession nearly four years before. "Atlanta is ours," he wired Washington, "and fairly won" (quoted in McPherson, 774).

The fall of Atlanta had a major impact on the remaining months of the war. The most direct impact was the damage sustained by the opposing forces – over the course of the campaign, the Confederates lost approximately 35,000 casualties compared to 34,500 Union losses. The next impact was psychological. The South felt a sense of panic and impending doom by Atlanta's fall, summed up by the words of diarist Mary Chesnut: "Since Atlanta fell, I have felt as if all were dead within me, forever…we are going to be wiped off the face of the earth" (ibid). In the North, cannons fired 100-gun salutes as a war-weary population became rejuvenated by a sense of near victory; indeed, the fall of Atlanta contributed to the re-election of President Abraham Lincoln in November. The third impact was strategic. The capture of Atlanta allowed Sherman to push further eastward in a scorched-earth campaign that would go down as Sherman's March to the Sea. Hood, meanwhile, would turn westward and embark on his ill-fated Franklin-Nashville Campaign.