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The Crisis of Rome: The Jugurthine and Northern Wars and the Rise of Marius Hardcover – June 16, 2010
Gaius Marius was the man of the hour. The first war he brought to an end through tactical brilliance, bringing the Numidian King Jugurtha back in chains. Before his ship even returned to Italy, the senate elected Marius to lead the war against the northern invaders. Reorganizing and reinvigorating the demoralized Roman legions, he led them to two remarkable victories in the space of months, crushing the Teutones and Ambrones at Aquiae Sextae and the Cimbri at Vercellae.
The Roman army emerged from this period of crisis a much leaner and more professional force and the author examines the extent to which the 'Marian Reforms' were responsible for this and the extent to which they can be attributed to Marius himself.
- Print length192 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPen and Sword Military
- Publication dateJune 16, 2010
- Dimensions6.25 x 1 x 9.75 inches
- ISBN-101844159728
- ISBN-13978-1844159727
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Product details
- Publisher : Pen and Sword Military; First Edition (1st printing), (June 16, 2010)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 192 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1844159728
- ISBN-13 : 978-1844159727
- Item Weight : 1.35 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.25 x 1 x 9.75 inches
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The only problem that I had with this book is that I received a different edition (the cover was different). I can't say anything about the edition with Marius on the cover, but mine had an overall impression of having been poorly edited. Not mentioning a great amount of typographical errors throughout the whole book it had, for example a blank page titled: "List of illustrations to follow once images are finalized". For me this is the second book of Pen & Sword Military that has that kind of problem (other one being "Mithridates the Great: Rome's Indomitable Enemy"), which is kind of strange considering that quality of paper and cover is quite ok.
But that is a minor thing. Otherwise a really worthy read.
This is because to understand what happened between 115 and 100 BC, there is a need to go back some thirty years at least, up to the destruction of Carthage and Corinth, or even further at times. This need to provided context is all the more necessary because the book is not only about three sets of events. Rather, the author manages to tell the story of how Rome adapted – or, perhaps more accurately, initially failed to adapt - to its imperial role. It also seeks to give the reader a feel of (almost literally) cut-throat ultra-competitive Roman politics, and how it became steadily more violent over the period.
In all these aims, the author has been largely (although perhaps not entirely) successful.
His first success is to show throughout the book, including in his set of appendixes, to what extent some of the assumptions currently made are in fact guesses which are not backed by any historical source. This is because we have gaps for critical parts and events of the period, including the lost volume of Titus Livius and the absence of any comprehensive narrative of the invasions of the Cimbri, Teutones (and others).
He also shows how little we really know about the supposedly sweeping “military reforms” that Marius – the “providential man”- allegedly introduced. Some of them were much less sweeping than historians have initially presented them to them. For instance, he did not, in fact, create a “professional army” because it was not a standing army. Both his legionaries, and those of the warlords that would come after him were paid a stipend while on campaign but demobilised at the end of each war. Moreover, the author shows that his “reforms” were practical at hoc measures to address very specific needs and that he was not the first to have introduced such reforms because these needs were wildly known.
One of these was the need to increase Roman manpower and this largely stemmed from the fact that the Roman Republic had become overstretched. Again, the author does a good job in showing to what extent this was the case, with the Republic getting embroiled in one war after another. This was partly as a result of previous expansion and partly because of competitive Roman politics, with each new Roman governor wanting to make a name for himself (and fill his pockets) during his tenure.
A fourth strong point of this book is to insert both the war against Jugurtha and the wars against the Cimbri and Teutones alongside all the other conflicts going on and showing their impact on Roman day-to-day politics. While this may lead to some back and forth and repetitions and force the reader to jump from one set of events to another, it does clearly show how these interacted.
Turning to the military campaigns, Gareth Sampson does again a rather good job in presenting the intentions of both sides, the problems that the various sets of opponents raised for the Romans. He is also good at analysing the various events. To some extent, his attempts to reconstruct the battles and to determine intentions may seem conjectural or even speculative at times, and it probably is. They nevertheless have the merit of being plausible or even quite likely. One element that I found particularly valuable was to show that the Roman armies were far from invincible. They were particularly vulnerable to ambushes, suffered from divided or poor command, and could break and be routed – as they were a number of times by the Cimbri and Teutones – especially when heavily outnumbered and deployed on unfavourable ground. Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this was the Roman disaster of Arausio which the author rightly ranks as being at least on par with Cannae.
Another valuable point is to show the tactical abilities of Jugurtha, but also to make sense of the apparently aimless wanderings of the “barbarian hordes” of Cimbri and Teutones (and a couple of other groups of tribes). Regarding the later, these seem to have been federations of tribes and, from a military point of view, they were probably not as crude as depicted by the Romans and seem to have learned quite a bit on how to fight them effectively from their victories against them.
There is however a few “glitches” in this book that prevent me from awarding it five stars. One is the existence of repetitions. These are at least partly a consequence of the author’s choice to tell several inter-acting stories in parallel. The existence of summaries at the end of his sections also leads to repetitions. These are also deliberate and probably intended to “remind” the so-called “general reader” of the main points which have just been made. They may (and, according to some of the other reviewers, have) put some readers off.
There are a few other problems as well. One is about numbers, where there is often a lack of clarity, especially with regards to the Cimbri and Teutones. These are alleged to have heavily outnumbered the Romans every time. However, the numbers given for these hordes – a quarter of a million for the smallest one and perhaps double that number for the largest with women and children all counted in – would not necessarily lead to an overwhelming superiority in numbers in all cases (even when considering that one out of every four Barbarian would be a warrior).
Another point that could have been discussed more in depth was the alleged “poor quality” of Jugurtha’s forces that the author contrasts with their leader’s military talent. The opposition is may be an over-simplification and a bit artificial. Numidian was renowned throughout Antiquity as first-class light skirmishing cavalry, and Numidian light infantry was not “poor quality”, even if perhaps not as good. What the author probably should have said was that neither was able to hold their ground in a pitched battle against more heavily equipped and better disciplined heavy Roman infantry operating in closed orders. Implying that one type of army is “poor quality” as opposed to the other because it is not fighting in the style it is equipped and trained to fight seemed a bit odd to me.